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INTRODUCTION

The most interesting and significant developments in the area of trial
practice and procedure during the survey period came not from Georgia's
appellate courts but from the Georgia General Assembly. This Article
will first analyze the significant legislation that came from beneath the
gold dome in 1997. It will then review the most significant appellate
cases.
II. LEGISLATION

The 1997 session of the Georgia General Assembly produced significant new legislation that will affect trial practitioners across the state.
The most notable enactments relate to health and medical insurance
reimbursement,' punitive damages,' the professional negligence
pleading requirement,' a new medical narrative hearsay exception,4
long arm venue,5 appeal procedures under Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") sections 5-6-34 and 5-6-35, the statutory limit on
parental liability for willful and malicious acts of minor children,'
deposition subpoenas,7 and clarification of rules relating to a party's
right to open and conclude in final argument.8
A. Health and Medical Insurance Reimbursement Law: A Play (Or,
Better Yet, Repay) in Two Acts
For practitioners in tort law, the most practical piece of new legislation from this past session is O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1. This statute
definitively delineates for the first time a health and medical benefit
provider's right of reimbursement, the procedure to be followed in
obtaining reimbursement, and the injured party's rights, including the
right to be fully compensated for all economic and noneconomic injuries
before a right of reimbursement can arise or be enforced.
Practitioners experienced the following dilemma in an increasing
number of personal injury cases. The client has been grievously injured
by a third-party tortfeasor. Long before the client recovers from the
1.
2.
3.
4.

See O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1 (Supp. 1997).
See id. § 51-12-5.1.
See id. § 9-11-9.1.
See id. § 24-3-18.

5.
6.
7.
8.

See id. § 9-10-93.
See id. § 51-2-3.
See id. § 9-11-45.
See id. § 9-10-186.
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tortfeasor, an insurance company that accepted a premium in exchange
for its agreement to pay medical bills in the event of a loss pays the
client's extensive medical bills. During the litigation with the tortfeasor,
the medical benefits provider seeks to assert a lien or claim reimbursement from any proceeds recovered from the tortfeasor or the liability
insurer. This claim is typically asserted pursuant to some provision in
the insuring agreement whereby the insurer claims that the contract
requires reimbursement for benefits it paid if a recovery is made from
a third party who caused the damages. The injured party obviously is
inclined to resist reimbursing the medical benefits provider from the
proceeds of the recovery. The typical victim confronted with a claim for
reimbursement wonders whether he or she paid a premium for the
medical benefits coverage or mistakenly took out a loan at a high rate
of interest. Several incisive questions relating to fundamental fairness
immediately spring to the mind of the injured party's lawyer. If the
insurance company gets its consideration back (the benefits it paid in
exchange for the premiums), does the client also get his or her consideration back (premium plus interest)? Does the client escape this
reimbursement requirement if the client has not been fully compensated
for all injuries by the tortfeasor because the recovery was necessarily the
result of a compromise?9 Is the client entitled to an offset for a

9. The theory that the injured person should be fully compensated for all economic and
noneconomic losses before any right of reimbursement or subrogation can arise on the part
of a health insurer has been called the "made whole" doctrine, the "complete compensation"
rule, and the "full compensation" rule by various authorities and has achieved wide
acceptance in various applications and to differing extents. See, e.g., Powell v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 581 So. 2d 772 (Ala. 1990); Marquez v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co.,
620 P.2d 29 (Colo. 1980); Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Martin, 377 So. 2d 827 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ross, 262 N.E.2d 618 (I1.
App. Ct. 1970); Capps v. Klebs, 382 N.E.2d 947 (Ind. App. Ct. 1978); Wescott v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 397 A.2d 156 (Me. 1979); Frost v. Porter Leasing Corp., 436 N.E.2d 387 (Mass.
1982); Westendorf v. Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1983); Home Ins. Co. v. Hartshorn,
91 So. 1 (Miss. 1922); Skauge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 565 P.2d 628 (Mont.
1977); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. W.P. Rose Supply Co., 198 S.E.2d 482 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1973); Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Hogges, 171 A.2d 120 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1961);
Lombardi v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 429 A.2d 1290 (R.I. 1981); Wimberly v. American
Cas. Co., 584 S.W.2d 200 (Tenn. 1979); Ortiz v. Great S. Fire & Cas. Co., 597 S.W.2d 342
(Tex. 1980); Vermont Indus. Dev. Auth. v. Setze, 600 A.2d 302 (Vt. 1991); Thiringer v.
American Motors Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 191 (Wash. 1978); Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 253
N.W.2d 512 (Wis. 1977). The authors refer to the doctrine in this Article as the complete
compensation rule.
The rationale for the rule is that the insured has paid the insurer a premium to accept
the risk of being required to pay the injured person's medical expenses and the risk that
the payments will go unreimbursed if, for instance, no person was at fault or if the at-fault
party is insolvent. If recovery can be obtained from the at-fault party but, for whatever
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proportionate share of attorney fees and expenses to be paid out of the
recovery from the tortfeasor?' The insurance representative typically
answers all of these questions with a confident "no." Thus, with the
proliferation of these claims for reimbursement, it became increasingly
difficult to finally resolve tort cases by settlement.
1. Act I. Until March 17, 1997, the answers to these questions in
Georgia were completely up in the air. On that date, the Supreme Court
of Georgia decided Duncan v. Integon General Insurance Corp."1 Peggy
Duncan was an injured person much like the hypothetical client above.
Her own auto insurer, Integon, had paid five thousand dollars in medical
payment benefits. Integon sought to recoup these benefits in full when
Ms. Duncan received a fifteen thousand dollar policy limit settlement
from the tortfeasor's insurance company. It was undisputed that Ms.
Duncan had not been fully compensated by the fifteen thousand dollar
settlement even when the Integon medical payments benefits of five
thousand dollars were added to the amount recovered.12 Ms. Duncan's
medical bills alone exceeded these amounts, not including any general
damages for pain and suffering or special damages for lost wages. 8
The supreme court was forced to address the following fundamental
question: Who receives first priority to compensatory funds from a
tortfeasor for injuries caused by the tortfeasor-an insurance company
that was paid a premium to assume the risk of payment of medical4
benefits or the injured person? Relying on "[tihe weight of authority,"'

the supreme court held that the injured person is entitled to first
priority until he has been completely compensated for all compensable
injuries unless a specific provision in the insurance policy negates the

reason, the recovery is insufficient to compensate fully the injured person for all injuries,
the question becomes who receives first priority from proceeds insufficient to compensate
both the injured person and the insurance company: the injured person or the insurance
company that was paid to accept the risk and that built this exact risk into the rates it
charged for the insurance policy. Increasingly, courts are siding with the injured person,
which is exactly the stance the General Assembly took in passing O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1.
10.

See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1 (Supp. 1997) (addressing reimbursement of providers

of workers' compensation benefits and specifically providing for offset reflecting reasonable
attorney fees and expenses of litigation expended in obtaining recovery from third-party
tortfesors).
11. 267 Ga. 646, 482 S.E.2d 325 (1997).
12. See id at 646, 482 S.E.2d at 325. "Ms. Duncan settled her $48,148 claim against
the tortfeasor for the $15,000 limit of his liability insurance policy." Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 647, 482 S.E.2d at 326. The supreme court cited Shelter Ins. Co. v. Frohlich,
498 N.W.2d 74,80 (Neb. 1993) and 8A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW &PRACTICE § 4903.65,
25 (Supp. 1996-1997).
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complete compensation rule.15 Although it indicated that "Georgia
public policy strongly supports" 16 the complete compensation rule, the
court declined to decide whether express policy language negating the
complete compensation rule would be enforced.17
Back to the hypothetical client. After reading Duncan, the lawyer
reviews the client's insurance policy to see what it says about the issue
of reimbursement. From the insured's perspective, the hope is that the
policy will be silent. The attorney for the injured party is already
mentally drafting a letter to the insurance representative and attaching
a copy of Duncan when she sees that the policy specifically declares that
reimbursement is to be made regardless of whether the injured client
has been completely compensated.
2. Act II. Enter the Georgia General Assembly, which enacted
O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1, effective July 1, 1997. This statute makes
complete compensation the rule no matter what the insurance policy
states. The pertinent provisions of O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1 state the
following:
(b) In the event of recovery for personal injury from a third party by
or on behalf of a person for whom any benefit provider has paid
medical expenses or disability benefits, the benefit provider for the
person injured may require reimbursement from the injured party of
benefits it has paid on account of the injury, up to the amount allocated
to those categories of damages in the settlement documents or
judgment, if: (1) The amount of the recovery exceeds the sum of all
economic and noneconomic losses incurred as a result of the injury,
exclusive of losses for which reimbursement may be sought under this
Code section; and (2) The amount of the reimbursement claim is
reduced by the pro rata amount of the attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation incurred by the injured party in bringing the claim. 8
Significantly, these provisions make it clear that before a right of
reimbursement ever arises, the injured person's recovery must exceed
"complete compensation" for all losses incurred as a result of the injury
The obvious reason for this aspect of the statute is that if an injured
person is completely compensated but no more than completely
compensated, then a reimbursement requirement would make him or her
less than compensated. This would be an absurd result for a remedial
statute.

15.
16.
17.
18.

267 Ga. at 647-48, 482 S.E.2d at 326-27.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1(b).
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The language in subsection (b)(1) of O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1---exclusive of losses for which reimbursement may be sought under this
Code section"--makes it clear that even if the injured person is more
than completely compensated, reimbursement can only be allowed to the
extent of the overcompensation and no more. The intent of the statute
is to give the injured person first priority of recovery from the tortfeasor
until complete compensation has been achieved. Only additional funds
that amount to a double recovery are to be returned to the insurance
company as reimbursement.
Subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1 also caps reimbursement
at "the amount allocated to those categories of damages in the settlement documents or judgment." In other words, the parties to a
settlement, or the finder of fact, can allocate an amount to medical
expenses (or disability). In no event can the insurer be reimbursed for
more than that amount.
The insurer has the right under subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. section 3324-56.1 to seek a declaratory judgment on its entitlement to reimbursement in the event compensation was paid to the injured person by way
of settlement. 9 Thus, the insurer has a remedy if it is believed that
the parties to the tort action assigned categories of damages that would
diminish fair reimbursement. However, if the trier of fact has allocated
the damages, then the allocation is conclusively presumed to be
reasonable. 20
Subsection (b)(2) of O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1 recognizes what has
come to be called the "common-fund" doctrine.2 ' This doctrine requires
all beneficiaries of a common fund, generated by the work of a lawyer
who represents only one or some of the beneficiaries, to pay a proportionate share of the attorney fees and expenses incurred in obtaining the
fund. To require the party who hired the lawyer to pay all the legal fees
for obtaining the entire fund would unjustly enrich the other beneficiaries.22 Accordingly, an insurer that receives reimbursement must
reduce the reimbursement to reflect a proportionate payment for
attorney fees and litigation expenses. 23
In this remarkable piece of legislation, subrogation-when the insurer
is not merely asking for repayment but instead is assigned the injured
person's right to recovery-is expressly prohibited by subsection (e) of
19. Id. § 33-24-56.1(c).

20. 1& § 33-24-56.1(d).
21. See Georgia v. Private Truck Council of Am., Inc., 258 Ga. 531,535,371 S.E.2d 378,
381 (1988) (citing Ewing v. First Natl Bank, 209 Ga. 932, 76 S.E.2d 791 (1953) and Boeing

Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)).
22. Id.
23. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1(bX2).

1997]

TRIAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

319

O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1.24 Also, this subsection prevents the
tortfeasor or its liability insurer from including an insurer claiming
reimbursement as a co-payee on a settlement check or check paying a
judgment. This provision is important in everyday practice because
prior to the enactment, medical benefit providers would frequently insist
on being listed as payee, thus requiring the injured party to completely
reimburse them or gaining added leverage in negotiating the amount of
reimbursement to the provider.
The legislation also provides that insurers may not reduce their
liability under any policy as a setoff against reimbursement claims, nor
may they withhold or set off insurance benefits as a means of enforcing
a claim for reimbursement.' This provision is important because it
prevents insurers from attempting an end-run around the complete
compensation rule or the other statutory requirements by withholding
or seeking to offset current and future benefits, which may be sorely
needed, thus delaying payment of the claim. In practical application this
issue regarding setoff or withholding of benefits frequently arises when
an injured party asserts a claim under uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverage provided under a policy that previously paid out
medical benefits under the separate medical payments coverage provided
by the same or a related policy issued by the same insurer.
The statutory scheme is balanced to protect the benefit provider, too.
Subsection (g) of O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1 requires the injured person
to notify insurance companies that may have a right of reimbursement
by certified mail that recovery is being sought from a third-party
tortfeasor. The insured must provide the notice at least ten days prior
to consummation of settlement or the beginning of trial. In this notice,
the injured person must "include a request for information regarding the
existence of any claim.., and an itemization of payments for which the
benefit provider seeks reimbursement including the names of payees, the
dates of service or payment or both, and the amounts thereof.'2
To preserve its claim for reimbursement once the statutorily required
notice has been given, the insurer must give the injured person the
following:
actual notice prior to the consummation of a settlement or commencement of trial, by certified mail... of the claim of the benefit provider
for reimbursement including a specific itemization of payments for
which the benefit provider seeks reimbursement, including the names

24. Id § 33-24-56.1(e).
25. Id. § 33-24-56.1(f).

26. Id. § 33-24-56.1(g).
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of payees,
27 the dates of service or payment or both, and the amounts
thereof.
The insurer can supplement its claims prior to settlement or trial, but
the supplementation must also comply with subsection (h) of the statute.
If the injured person fails to notify the insurer of the pendency of a claim
against a third-party tortfeasor pursuant to subsection (g), the insurer
is not required to give the injured party notice of its claim pursuant to
subsection (h).
Insurers cannot contractually avoid the provisions of this statute.'
To the extent the terms of a settlement are relevant to adjudication of
the issues created by this statute, those terms are admissible even if the
settlement declares them confidential.29 Finally, the section has no
application when a workers' compensation carrier seeks reimbursement
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1. Likewise, the newly enacted
statute has no application as against the Department of Medical
Assistance when it claims a right of reimbursement for Medicare and
Medicaid benefits paid out by the state."0
B.

Punitive Damages

The General Assembly amended Georgia's punitive damages statute
to remove the cap on punitive damages against defendants acting under
the influence of alcohol or drugs.3 1 Before the change, punitive
damages were capped at $250,000 except in product liability cases and
cases when the defendant's conduct evinces a "specific intent" to cause
harm. 2
The appellate courts interpreted specific intent to cause harm as
requiring a defendant's subjective intent to harm the plaintiff-a
virtually impossible standard of proof in anything but an intentional tort
even at the pretrial summary judgment stage.3 The anomalous result:
an impaired driver who ran over and killed an innocent victim could not
be subjected to punitive damages in excess of $250,000, but a person who
intentionally damaged personal property could.

27. Id. § 33-24-56.1(h).

28. 1& § 33-24-56.1(j).
29. Id. § 33-24-56.1(k).
30. Id. § 33-24-56.1(1).
31. Id. § 51-12-5.1.
32. Id. § 51-12-5.1(e), (f).
33. See Viau v. Fred Dean, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 801, 804-05, 418 S.E.2d 604, 608 (1992);
J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. Bentley, 207 Ga. App. 250, 255-56, 427 S.E.2d 499, 503-04
(1992).
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The new punitive damages statute changes this result. If the
defendant acted while under the influence of "alcohol, drugs other than
lawfully prescribed drugs administered in accordance with prescription,
or any intentionally consumed glue, aerosol, or other toxic vapor to that
degree that his or her judgment is substantially impaired,"34 punitive
damages are not capped." This provision applies not just in the
context of motor vehicles but to any tortfeasor who acts under the
influence of alcohol, drugs, or toxic vapors.
The statute presumably treats defendants alleged to be liable under
a theory of passive negligence differently than tortfeasors guilty of active
negligence. The statute indicates that passive tortfeasors are not
subjected to unlimited punitive damages awards.' However, it seems
apparent from the language of the statute that a tortfeasor who is liable
under both active and passive theories (such as an employer sued
because it tortiously entrusted a dangerous instrumentality to a person
with a known habit of recklessness and also sued under a respondeat
superior theory) could legally be subjected to liability for punitive
damages in excess of $250,000 in connection with the active liability
theory. 7
C.

The ProfessionalNegligence PleadingRequirement
The infamous malpractice affidavit pleading requirement, O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.1, was finally amended, perhaps in response to persistent
calls from the appellate courts. 8 The changes incorporate procedural
and substantive fairness in an attempt to align the provision with the
overall goals of the Civil Practice Act of justly, efficiently, and inexpensively resolving cases on their merits.3 9
By enacting these changes, the legislature has removed a potentially
serious legal malpractice trap for the practitioner. The statute now
specifically enumerates the professions to which the pleading requirement applies.4 No longer will a practitioner be surprised to discover,
belatedly, that he or she should have filed a malpractice affidavit in an

34.

O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f).

35. I.
36. 1&
37. See Gilbert v. C.S.X. Transp., Inc., 197 Ga. App. 29, 33, 397 S.E.2d 447, 451 (1990)
(holding that defendant's "separate and independent acts ofnegligence" in sending plaintiff
to the plant in truck without cab shield is not passive as matter of law).
38. See Johnson v. Brueckner, 216 Ga. App. 52, 53-54, 453 S.E.2d 76, 78 (1994)
(Blackburn, J.) (pointing out that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 is rigorous and unfair and has
resulted in increased, rather than decreased, litigation).
39. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 (1993).
40. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a), (M.
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action against a harbor pilot.'
Additionally, a claim against an
organization, even if the underlying act or omission is one of professional
negligence, does not require a malpractice affidavit unless the organization is a "licensed healthcare facility. 2
Hopefully, the statute now makes it clear that practitioners will no
longer be required to guess whether a potential claim against the
Department of Transportation for poor road design or against a product
maker for a design defect requires a malpractice affidavit.' As long as
the entity sued is not a professional and is not a licensed healthcare
facility, no pleading affidavit is required.
The exception to the pleading requirement found in subsection (b) of
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 for cases when the statute of limitations will
expire within ten days now applies if the lawyer has "a good faith basis
to believe [the statute of limitations] will expire on any claim stated in
the complaint."' In this scenario, the affidavit may be filed within
forty-five days after the filing of the complaint or a longer time period
if the court allows. Thus, a lawyer who is legitimately unsure of when
the statute of limitations will expire is not forced into the Hobson's
choice of filing the lawsuit without an affidavit and hoping the statute
of limitations was about to expire or not filing the lawsuit and hoping
the statute of limitations was not about to expire. The exception is
available to a plaintiff when the statute of limitations is about to expire
as to any stated theory of recovery and not just a potential medical
malpractice claim.
This subsection, as amended, creates an unintended dilemma for
defense lawyers. If the plaintiff fails to submit an affidavit within the
required forty-five days after filing the complaint or within any longer
period allowed by the trial court, the defendant must preserve the issue
by a "motion to dismiss filed contemporaneously with its initial

41. See Lutz v. Foran, 262 Ga. 819,820,427 S.E.2d 248, 249 (1993) (applying pleading
requirement to actions alleging professional negligence against harbor pilot).
42. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a). This aspect of the amended statute seems to indicate, for
example, that a plaintiff who sues a physician doing business as a professional corporation
will not be required to file an affidavit under the statute. A professional corporation is
neither a "professional licensed by the State of Georgia" nor a "licensed healthcare facility."
Id
43. The courts have answered the former question affirmatively and the latter
negatively. See SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Lowman, 223 Ga. App. 712,712-16,479 S.E.2d 103,
104-07 (1996) (pleading requirement inapplicable to strict product liability design defect
claims); Jackson v. Department of Transp., 201 Ga. App. 863,865-66,412 S.E.2d 847,84950 (1991) (pleading requirement applicable to a claim against Department of Transportation for negligent design of road).
44. O.C.G-.A § 9-11-9.1(b).
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responsive pleading."4" However, the initial responsive pleading, which
is usually the answer, is due thirty days after service of the complaint."
The former provision that suspended the time for the defendant to
answer the plaintiff's complaint until thirty days after an affidavit is
filed has been repealed. So, it might be argued that the defendant is
technically required to file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
based on failure to file a malpractice affidavit before the plaintiff is even
required by law to file the affidavit. Otherwise, presumably, this plea
in abatement is waived. The legislature should amend the statute to
correct this unintended result. Otherwise, the law will encourage
needless motions to- dismiss in every case in which subsection (b) of
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 is utilized.'
The statute continues to provide that it shall not be construed to
extend the applicable statute of limitations. However, the amended
language makes clear that as long as an affidavit is timely filed, filing
an affidavit after the running of the applicable statute of limitations
does not create a statute of limitations defense."
The legislature deleted the provision from the former statute, which
stated that if a plaintiff fails to file an affidavit with the complaint and
the defendant raises this failure in the initial responsive pleading, the
complaint is subject to dismissal and cannot be amended pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-15 unless the plaintiff had the affidavit prior to
filing of the lawsuit and the failure was the result of a mistake. 9 Two
significant changes were made in connection with this issue.
First, the defendant must raise the plaintiff's failure to file the
affidavit "by motion to dismiss filed contemporaneously with [the] initial
responsive pleading."' Second, if the objection is so preserved, the
complaint shall not be subject to renewal under Georgia's renewal
statute unless the plaintiff had the affidavit within the time required by
the statute and the failure was the result of a mistake.51
The meaning of this newly inserted language relating to the renewal
statute may be more significant than it might at first appear. Under the
former statute, as interpreted by the courts, a dismissal based on a
45. Id.
46. Id. § 9-11-12(a) (1993).

47. This dilemma may be more academic than practical. In the first place, a small
number of lawsuits involve subsection (b). Second, defendants would most likely file a
motion to dismiss when the plaintiff has invoked subsection (b)anyway.
48. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(c).
49. Id. § 9-11-9.1(e) (1993).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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failure to file the requisite affidavit was on the merits and with
prejudice.'
Such a claim could not be "renewed" if the statute of
limitations had expired, nor could it be "refiled" with the requisite
affidavit if the statute of limitations had not expired. By inserting this
language preventing renewal when the statute of limitations has
expired, it seems the legislature may implicitly have changed the law to
allow refiling when the statute of limitations has not expired. Otherwise, this new language would be meaningless."
The language that the failure to state a claim cannot be cured by
amendment pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-15 ("Rule 15") has been
dropped. Accordingly, one could reasonably infer that an amendment
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-15 adding the requisite affidavit will
now be allowed. This interpretation, however, is undercut by the fact
that another part of the statute as amended, O.C.G.A. section 9-119.1(d), relating to an allegedly defective affidavit, specifically allows a
curative amendment pursuant to Rule 15. One could reasonably argue
that if the legislature intended for a failure to file an affidavit to be
curable by amendment, it could have expressly said so just as it did in
the context of an allegedly defective affidavit in subsection (d).
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(d), addressing the procedural aspects and
effect of allegedly defective affidavits, is new. If the affidavit is alleged
to be defective, the defendant must move to dismiss with specificity
(whatever specificity means in the context of a motion) contemporaneously with the initial responsive pleading. The plaintiff may cure the
defect by a Rule 15 amendment within thirty days of the motion or
longer if the court allows. This new language in subsection (d) may not
be as significant, however, in light of a recent Georgia case, Washington
v. Georgia Baptist Medical Center.54 In Washington the court of
appeals held that an insufficient affidavit could be amended pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-15.5
The amended professional negligence pleading requirement may
accomplish what the legislature intended from the beginning. It seems
less likely to create its own cottage litigation industry. It is more
balanced and may more effectively discourage frivolous suits without
killing legitimate suits on technicalities rather than on the merits.

52. Abe Eng'g, Inc. v. Griffin, Cochran & Marshall, 212 Ga. App. 586, 443 S.E.2d 1
(1994).
53. See, e.g., Lawson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 645, 647, 481 S.E.2d 856, 860 (1997) (if
avoidable, a statute should not be interpreted so as to render any statutory provision
meaningless); City of Buchanan v. Pope, 222 Ga. App. 716, 717, 476 S.E.2d 53, 55 (1996).
54. 223 Ga. App. 762, 478 S.E.2d 892 (1996).
55. Id. at 764, 478 S.E.2d at 895.
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D. A New Hearsay Exception: The Medical Narrative
Perhaps the most innovative piece of legislation coming from the
recent legislative session is O.C.G.A. section 24-3-18.

In a personal

injury trial, this statute allows the admission into evidence of a treating
or examining licensed medical practitioner's "medical report in narrative
form" in place of more expensive live or deposition testimony. The report
must purport to represent the patient's "history, examination, diagnosis,
treatment, prognosis, or interpretation of tests or examinations,
including the basis therefor, by the person signing the report.""
The law affords procedural protection to the opponent of the evidence
contained in the narrative. First, the proponent of the evidence must
provide the opponent with the report and notice of the intention to
introduce the report at least sixty days prior to trial.5 7 Then, the
opponent has fifteen days to object to the admissibility of the narrative
on grounds other than hearsay." Any adverse party has the right to
cross-examine the person signing the report and to provide rebuttal
testimony.5 9 Additionally, the party tendering the report may introduce
the testimony of the person who signed the report.' The report shall
be submitted to the jury the same way a deposition is submitted."' It
does not go out to the jury during deliberations as documentary
evidence.
The practical effect of this legislation may be that the expense and
initiative of a deposition or live testimony of a medical provider is
shifted to the party who insists on an adversarial context for the taking
of evidence. A party will no longer be required to take formal, costly,
and time-consuming testimony to confirm what the previously inadmissible medical records say.
E.

Venue Under the Long Arm Statute
Three substantial changes were made to venue under the Long Arm
Statute. 2 The most needed revision comes into play in cases involving
multiple defendants. Previously, venue as to a nonresident tortfeasor
was proper only in the county where the tortious act or omission

56. O.C.G-A. § 24-3-18(a) (Supp. 1997).
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 24-3-18(b).
62. Id. § 9-10-93 (1982).
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occurred.' For purposes of the joint tortfeasor venue provision (which
allows suit to be filed against both defendants in the county of either
defendant's residence)," a nonresident defendant under the Long Arm
Statute was not considered a "resident" of the county in which the
tortious act or omission occurred. 5
A plaintiff, therefore, was unable to sue resident and nonresident joint
tortfeasors in the same county unless the resident tortfeasor was a
resident of the county where the tortious act or omission occurred. For
instance, if defendant A was a resident of Tennessee, defendant B was
a resident of Fulton County, and the collision occurred in DeKalb
County, defendant A could only be sued in DeKalb County, and
defendant B could only be sued in Fulton County. Two lawsuits would
be required unless one of the defendants was willing to waive venue as
a defense.
*Now, "[wihere an action is brought against a resident of this state, any
nonresident of this state who is involved in the same transaction or
occurrence and who is suable under the provisions of [the Long Arm
Statute] may be joined as a defendant in the county where a resident
defendant is suable.' This change makes sense because a nonresident
has no vested interest in any particular venue. In a further application
of common-sense reform, the amendment also adds that venue will not
"vanish" as to the nonresident if a defense verdict or judgment is
rendered as to the resident defendant.6 7 If the resident defendant is
dismissed prior to commencement of trial, the action shall be transferred

63. Id. § 9-10-93.
64. GA. CONST. art. VI, § II, para. IV. See also O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31 (1982).

65. See Goodman v. Vilston, Inc., 197 Ga. App. 718, 720, 399 S.E.2d 241, 243 (1990)
(although the Long Arm Statute confers jurisdiction over a nonresident, for purposes of
joint tortfeasor venue provision, it does not confer residency status upon nonresident
defendants).
66.
67.

O.C.G. § 9-10-93.
Id. Georgia practitioners are painfully familiar with the age-old and uniquely

Georgia phenomenon of "vanishing venue." If, for whatever reason, the only resident
defendant(s) is absolved of liability, even after trial, or even after appeal, venue vanishes
over joint tortfeasors who were not residents of the county where the case is pending. Any
verdict or judgment vanishes as well, and the parties must begin anew in a county where
venue properly lies. See, e.g., Ross v. Battle, 117 Ga. 877, 880, 45 S.E. 252, 254 (1903);
Brooks v. H & H Creek, Inc., 223 Ga. App. 635, 638, 478 S.E.2d 451, 455 (1996); Collipp
v. Newman, 217 Ga. App. 674, 675, 458 S.E.2d 701, 701-02 (1995); Zepp v. Toporek, 211
Ga. App. 169, 172, 438 S.E.2d 636, 640 (1993); Timberlake Grocery Co. v. Cartwright, 146
Ga. App. 746, 747, 247 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1978).
The long arm venue statute eliminating "vanishing venue" in at least one context marks
the first in-roads the legislature has made on this inefficient and uneconomical
anachronism in Georgia law. Perhaps more will come in the future, and the costly doctrine
of vanishing venue will itself vanish.
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to a county where venue is proper.' The amendment applies equally
in a contract case or a case involving real property. At long last, a
lawsuit involving a nonresident and a resident sued jointly can be
brought at once.
Also, in a tort case, venue against a nonresident has been expanded
to include not just the county wherein the act or omission took place but
also where the injury occurred."" This addition makes it clear that a
tortfeasor who acts outside the state but causes injury within the state
is subject
to venue in a county in Georgia under the Long Arm Stat70
ute.
The final change to the venue provisions of the Long Arm Statute
applies to contract cases. No longer is the practitioner required to pick
the county wherein "the business was transacted." 7' In many complex
business transactions in which performances extend beyond the confines
of one or more counties, selecting one county where "the business was
transacted" amounts to purely a guessing game. Now, venue is
appropriate in any county wherein "a substantial part of the business
was transacted."72 If a transaction involves multiple counties, venue
can be had in any of the counties as long as the business transacted was
a substantial part of the overall transaction to which the lawsuit
relates.73
F

Appeal Procedures Under O.C.G.A. Sections 5-6-34 and 5-6-35
Practitioners have often experienced an appellate dilemma in
attempting to negotiate an appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. sections 5-6-34
and 5-6-35. Section 5-6-34(a) defines when a case is directly appealable,
including final judgments; section 5-6-35(a) defines when certain final
judgments must be appealed by filing an application to appeal.
What does one do if the case seems to be a directly appealable final
judgment under section 5-6-34(a) and may or may not, depending upon
one's interpretive skills, also require an application to appeal under
section 5-6-35(a) and (b)? Strict compliance with the applicable provision

68. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93.
69. 1I.
70. This amendment brings the venue provision in line with the long arm jurisdictional
statute, O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91 (1982), which authorizes the state to exercise jurisdiction
against a defendant who committed a tortious act outside Georgia that caused injury in

Georgia.
71. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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has consistently been held to be a prerequisite to the appellate court's
jurisdiction on appeal. 7
Previously, the practitioner had three equally vexing choices. The
practitioner could file an application pursuant to section 5-6-35(b) and
not file a notice of appeal, risking dismissal if the appellate court
determined the case did not fall within section 5-6-35(a). The practitioner could file a notice of appeal, risking dismissal if the appellate court
determined the case did fall within section 5-6-35(a). Alternatively, the
practitioner could file a notice of appeal and an application for an appeal
and thoroughly confuse the busy appellate court.
Now, O.C.G.A. section 5-6-35 has been amended to add subsection (f).
This subsection makes it clear that if a case is directly appealable
pursuant to section 5-6-34(a) and an application is not required pursuant
to section 5-6-35, but the attorney nonetheless files an application
pursuant to 5-6-35(b), the appellate court retains jurisdiction to hear the
appeal as if section 5-6-35(a) actually applies.75 Consequently, if one
is confused about whether to appeal directly or to apply for permission,
there is no penalty if the appellate court disagrees with the lawyer's
determination of the issue so long as one opts to file an application
pursuant to section 5-6-35.
G. ParentalLiability for Willfull and MaliciousActs of Minor
Children
Under O.C.G.A. section 51-2-3, a custodial parent or guardian is now
responsible for the willfull and malicious acts of a minor child causing
reasonable medical expenses, property damage, or both up to ten
thousand dollars plus court costs. The prior limitation was five
thousand dollars and only allowed recovery for property damage.'
H. Attorney Signature Sufficient for Deposition Subpoenas
Often, as a trial practitioner, the situation arises when a deposition
subpoena is needed but cannot be located in the office. It would
certainly be easier on everyone, the busy trial courts included, if
attorneys could simply agree to sign deposition subpoenas themselves.
After all, lawyers have long been given the power to notice depositions
of a party without involving the courts in any way.77
The legislature has now amended the subpoena statute, O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-45, to allow attorneys to agree that they will sign deposition
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Boyle v. State, 190 Ga. App. 734, 380 S.E.2d 57 (1989).
O.CG.A. § 5-6-35 (Supp. 1997).
Id. § 51-2-3(a) (1982).
Id. § 9-11-30 (1993).
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subpoenas. The subpoena will be effective so long as the signing
attorney is authorized to practice before the court issuing the subpoena
or the court in which the action is pending. 8
I. FinalArguments: Who Can Open and Close
It has long been the rule in Georgia jurisprudence that if the
defendant (who does not have the burden of proof) puts up no evidence
or admits a "prima facie case," the defendant has the right to open and
close final arguments. 7' Recently, however, the appellate courts have
expanded the defendant's right to open and close by broadening what is
meant by admitting a prima facie case.
For instance, what if the defendant in a personal injury trial admits
duty and breach but denies causation and damages? What if that
defendant puts up evidence contesting damages only? Accepted wisdom
has always been that in such a scenario, the plaintiff, who still has the
burden of proof as to essential elements of the tort claim asserted, would
still be allowed to open and close in final argument. A prima facie tort
claim for negligence involves each of the elements of duty, breach,
causation, and damages.
The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed. In Peters v. Davis,' the
court held that all a defendant must do in order to secure the right to
open and close is to admit duty and breach or present no evidence.81
The defendant apparently could put up as many witnesses as it wished
on half of the elements of a prima facie tort case for negligence--causation and damages--and still be allowed to open and
conclude in the final argument. It appeared that one definition of a
prima facie negligence case applied in Georgia and another definition
applied for the other forty-nine states.
O.C.G.A. section 9-10-186 makes it clear that in a personal injury case,
the only way to admit a prima facie case is to admit all the elements of
a prima facie case. The only evidence a defendant can introduce and
still preserve the right to open and close arguments is cross-examination
of the plaintiff and witnesses called by the plaintiff. Even then, the
argument remains that if the scope of the cross-examination exceeds the
direct examination, the defendant may be argued to have introduced
evidence.

78. Id. § 9-11-45.
79. See UNIF. SUP. CT. R. 13.4 (1997). See also Lissmore v. Kincade, 188 Ga. App. 548,
549-50, 373 S.E.2d 819, 822 (1988).
80. 214 Ga. App. 885, 449 S.E.2d 624 (1994).
81. Id. at 887, 449 S.E.2d at 626.
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CASE LAW

PersonalJurisdiction
One case stands out in the area of personal jurisdiction during this
year's survey period. The Georgia Court of Appeals gave a lengthy
discussion of the "conspiracy theory" of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant under the Georgia Long Arm Statute 2 in Rudo
v. Stubbs.' In Rudo a Georgia resident (defendant Wilson) contacted
a Georgia resident (plaintiff Stubbs) to suggest that Stubbs purchase a
set of coins from Gobrecht Numismatics. Gobrecht happens to be a
Maryland sole proprietorship owned by defendant O'Higgins and
managed by defendant Rudo, both of whom are nonresidents." To
obtain jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in Georgia, the exercise
of jurisdiction must comport with due process, and the nonresident must
have committed one of the acts set forth in the Georgia Long Arm
Statute. However, the Long Arm Statute does not require that the
nonresident have personally committed a listed act but provides that the
act may be committed "through an agent.'
Because coconspirators act as agents of each other when they commit
acts in furtherance of a conspiracy," the court of appeals stated its
agreement with the principle that the "in-state acts of a resident
[coconspirator] may be imputed to a nonresident [coconspirator] to
satisfy jurisdictional requirements under some circumstances." 7 In
Rudo the court of appeals held that in order to satisfy the requirements
of due process under a conspiracy theory of jurisdiction, the alleged
conspiracy must be targeted at one or more Georgia residents specifically: "When the purpose of a conspiracy is to commit an intentional tort
against a Georgian, all of the [coconspirators] are purposefully directing
their activities toward Georgia and should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court here."8
The court of appeals cautioned that the plaintiff must provide more
than mere conclusory allegations of the nonresidents participation in a
A.

82. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91.
83.
84.
85.
86.
82 Ga.

221 Ga. App. 702, 472 S.E.2d 515 (1996).
Id. at 702, 472 S.E.2d at 516.
See O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91.
221 Ga. App. at 703, 472 S.E.2d at 516 (citing American Thread Co. v. Rochester,
App. 873, 62 S.E.2d 602 (1950)).

87. Id.
88. Id. at 704, 472 S.E.2d at 517 (citing National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel,
B.M., 514 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Ga. 1981)).
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conspiracy with a resident.8 9 The court set forth the requirement of an
evidentiary showing of conspiracy, rather than mere allegations of a
conspiracy, unless the allegations are unrefuted.
The standard of proof to be applied and the effect of a finding are
unclear. For instance, if the trial court finds a conspiracy which satisfies
personal jurisdiction, is this finding conclusive as to the tort of conspiracy? If so, is the defendant entitled to a jury determination? If not, does
jurisdiction vanish upon a finding by the jury that no conspiracy existed
(or that the defendant was not a part)? What happens to personal
jurisdiction if the jury finds the nonresident liable for the underlying tort
but not liable for conspiracy? These questions remain.
B. Service of Process
In two unrelated cases, the court of appeals addressed the issue of due
diligence in attempting to perfect service*on defendants. First, in Jones
v. Isom,9 plaintiffs filed suit in Clayton County, but the court dismissed the suit because defendant could not be served there. Suit was
refiled in Fulton County (one would assume so that defendant could be
properly served) well within the statute of limitations.' For some
unknown reason, defendant was never personally served with a copy of
the summons and complaint even though the attorney retained by defendant's insurance company sent several letters to plaintiffs' counsel to
determine whether defendant had been served. In September 1995,
defendant was appointed new counsel who filed an entry of appearance.
In November 1995, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
perfect service within the statute of limitations. The trial court granted
the motion.93
The issue on appeal was whether defendant's counsel's entry of
appearance, filed twenty months after the complaint was filed and seven
months after the statute of limitations had expired, waived the service
requirement and obligated defendant to file an answer within thirty
days. The court of appeals held that it did not, 9' distinguishing the
case from Keith v. Alexander Underwriters, Etc.95 In Keith the court

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 223 Ga. App. 7, 477 S.E.2d 139 (1996).
92. Id. at 7, 477 S.E.2d at 139. The automobile collision giving rise to the suit occurred
on February 1, 1993. The complaint was filed in Fulton County on January 21, 1994. Id.
93. Id., 477 S.E.2d at 139-40.
94. Id., 477 S.E.2d at 140.
95. Id. at 7-8, 477 S.E.2d at 140 (distinguishing Keith v. Alexander Underwriter Etc.,
219 Ga. App. 36, 463 S.E.2d 732 (1995)).
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held that defendants waived service by filing an entry of appearance and
that the time the appearance was made "is the equivalent of the time
service of process is made in a normal case.' g
The difference, according to the court in Jones, was that there was no
indication in Keith that the statute of limitations had expired; therefore,
plaintiff was not required to show due diligence in perfecting service or
to obtain a waiver of service in order for his claim to relate back to the
time of filing.97 The court cited the well-established rule that when an
action is filed within the statute of limitations period but is not served
within the limitations period, plaintiff must establish that he or she
acted in a reasonable and diligent manner in attempting to ensure that
proper service was effected as quickly as possible." The court then
held that plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing due diligence
to ensure that service was made." The court held that "even if [defendant's] counsel's notice of appearance constituted a waiver of service at
the time it was filed, the burden was still on [plaintiff] to show due
diligence and lack of fault in failing to serve [defendant] within the
statute of limitations.""° Because plaintiffs failed to show any reasonable effort on their part in effecting service of process, the court of
appeals affirmed the dismissal."0 '
In another due diligence case, Jackson v. Nguyen,"2 the court of
appeals was satisfied that plaintiffs had exercised reasonable diligence
in ensuring that service was perfected.0" In Jackson the complaint
was filed on May 24, 1995, and the statute of limitations ran on May 29,
1995. Service was not perfected until seventeen days after the statute
of limitations expired even though defendant's correct address was listed
on the complaint. Plaintiff's lawyer offered that he had turned the
matter over to the sheriff for service. 1'4
Although the general rule is that "'[tihe burden is on the plaintiff, not
the sheriff, to show diligence in attempting to insure that proper service
has been made as quickly as possible, '"" the court noted that this was
not a case in which plaintiff was put on notice of a problem by unsuc-

96.
97.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
S.E.2d

219 Ga. App. at 39, 463 S.E.2d at 734.
223 Ga. App. at 8, 477 S.E.2d at 140.

Id.
Id.
Id., 477 S.E.2d at 140-41.
Id.
225 Ga. App. 599, 484 S.E.2d 337 (1997).
Id. at 600, 484 S.E.2d at 338.
Id. at 599-600, 484 S.E.2d at 338.
Id. at 600, 484 S.E.2d at 338 (quoting Corley v. Gilley, 205 Ga. App. 660, 661, 423
55, 56 (1992)).
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cessful attempts to serve defendants, nor was it a case in which service
was not perfected until years after the complaint was filed." e The
court reiterated the principle that a "'plaintiff should not be penalized
for reasonably relying upon the sheriff to fulfill his duty to serve
properly addressed process papers.'"10 7 In giving the sheriff the proper
address of defendant for service on the date the complaint was timely
filed, the court found that the record showed that plaintiffs had done all
that was initially required of them."° The court held that as a matter
of law, plaintiffs were justified in relying on the sheriff to perform his
duty to make service at the address given within five days of receiving
the summons and complaint.'
C.

Venue
The Georgia Court of Appeals had occasion to interpret the venue
provision of the State Tort Claims Act"' during this year's survey
period. Evans v. Department of Transportation"' was a wrongful
death action brought by Josephine Evans for the death of her daughter,
Frances Evans, who was killed when she lost control of her car on a wet
highway and collided with a tractor-trailer. The collision occurred in
Columbia County; Frances Evans was hospitalized and died in Richmond
County. Plaintiff brought suit in Richmond County, and the trial court
transferred venue to Columbia County."2
Venue for tort actions against the Georgia Department of Transportation ("D.O.T.") is governed by O.C.G.A. section 50-21-28:
All tort actions against the state under this article shall be brought in
the state or superior court of the county wherein the loss occurred;
provided, however, that, in any case in which an officer or employee of
the state may be included as a defendant in his individual capacity, the
action mayn be brought in the county of residence of such officer or
employee'1'

106. Id
107. Id. (quoting Deloach v. Hewes, 211 Ga. App. 321, 321, 439 S.E.2d 94, 95 (1993)
and Bennett v. Matt Gay Chevrolet Oldsmobile, 200 Ga. App. 348,350 n.2, 408 S.E.2d 111,
114 n.2 (1991)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 601, 484 S.E.2d at 339. See also O.C.G- § 9-11-4(c) (1993) ("When service
is to be made within this state, the person making such service shall make the service
within 5 days from the time of receiving the summons and complaint.")
110. See O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 to -37 (1994).
111. 226 Ga. App. 74, 485 S.E.2d 243 (1997).
112. Id. at 75, 485 S.E.2d at 244.
113. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28.
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'The correct venue hinged on the definition of the term "loss" contained
in the venue provision. Plaintiff argued that the loss in this case was
her daughter's death, which occurred in Richmond County. The D.O.T.
argued that the loss occurred in Columbia County where the collision
took place. The D.O.T. also argued that plaintiff had filed another suit
in Columbia County for injuries her daughter received in the collision
and that judicial economy dictated that the wrongful death case also be
4
tried there."
The court of appeals agreed with plaintiff that venue in her wrongful
death action was proper in Richmond County and only in Richmond
County.115 The court relied on the "plain" and "unambiguous" language of the Tort Claims Act, which defines "loss" as follows: "'Loss'
means personal injury; disease; death; damage to tangible property,
including lost wages and economic loss to the person who suffered the
injury, disease, or death; pain and suffering; mental anguish; and any
other element of actual damages recoverable in actions for negligence."" 6 The court held that it was bound to follow the "plain and
unambiguous" language unless doing so would lead to "contradictory,
absurd, or wholly impracticable results." 7
In a footnote the court acknowledged that this venue provision, read
literally, could result in a waste of state and judicial resources when
there are various claims for damages that all equate to a loss under the
statute and that could require the filing of a myriad of suits in multiple
counties."" The court further noted that this result seems to require
a violation of O.C.G.A. section 9-2-5(a), which prohibits the splitting of
a cause of action. However, the court must have implicitly held that the
result is not "contradictory, absurd, or wholly impracticable" and left
these problems to the legislature."'
D. ProperPartiesand Claims
Two cases, Redding v. Walker' 20 and Canal Insurance Co. v. Farmer,12 1 are both notable for their lack of equity, and both cases cry out
for legislative action. In Redding, an automobile collision case, plaintiffs
filed personal injury actions against Walker, the owner of the car that

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

226 Ga. App. at 74-75, 485 S.E.2d at 24445.
Id. at 75, 485 S.E.2d at 245.
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-22(3) (1994).
226 Ga. App. at 75, 485 S.E.2d at 245.
Id., 485 S.E.2d at 245 n.2.
See id.
225 Ga. App. 653, 485 S.E.2d 252 (1997).
222 Ga. App. 539, 474 S.E.2d 732 (1996).
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collided with them, and Watson, the driver of Walker's car. After the
suits were filed, defendant Walker was released from all dischargeable
debts by order of the bankruptcy court. The trial court dismissed
Walker on the basis of the bankruptcy discharge. Plaintiffs appealed,
contending that the dismissal of Walker had the erroneous effect of
dismissing her insurer.12 2
The court of appeals had to jump through several procedural hurdles
in finding that it could decide the case. The motion in the trial court
was styled as a motion to dismiss and was referred to as such in the
court's order."m However, the court of appeals interpreted the motion
as a motion for summary judgment because it presented the defense of
bankruptcy discharge rather than one of the defenses contained in
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-12(b). 12 Further, the court of appeals noted that
defendant attached evidence to the motion (the order of discharge in
bankruptcy) that the trial court considered in its ruling." Although
the court recognized that when a motion to dismiss is converted to a
motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant should have thirty days
in which to respond with opposing evidence and that plaintiffs were not
allowed the time, the court decided that the result would be the same
even if plaintiffs had been given full time to respond."
Plaintiffs argued that the discharge in bankruptcy did not allow
Walker's liability insurer to escape liability and that the case should
continue with Walker as defendant to the limit of her insurance.' 7
The court of appeals disagreed."m2 The court noted that no insurer was
a party to the suit, and no evidence in the record showed that Walker
had liability insurance (even though plaintiffs were not given the time
to present this evidence)."m The court found no authority for the
proposition that plaintiffs were entitled to retain defendant in the

122.
123.
124.

225 Ga. App. at 653-54, 485 S.E.2d at 253.
Id. at 654, 485 S.E.2d at 253.
Id.

125. Id The court of appeals also reasoned that a bankruptcy discharge is an
affirmative defense, which asserts a bar to recovery and not merely an abatement of an
action. Id. The court used the distinction as an additional basis for calling the trial court's

ruling a summary judgment rather than a dismissal because matters in abatement are the
subject of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-12(b) (except O.C.GA. § 9-11-12(b)(6)) and matters in bar
are the subject of summary judgments. Id., 485 S.E.2d at 254.
126. Id. at 655-56, 485 S.E.2d at 254. (The court, it seems, applied the standard for

deciding a motion to dismiss by deciding the plaintiff could not recover under any set of
facts.)

127. Id. at 655, 485 S.E.2d at 254.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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lawsuit, even nominally, in order to obligate her insurer with a judgment
based on the contract of insurance for liability coverage. 180
The court of appeals distinguished Wilkinson v. Vigilant Insurance
Co., ' a case that held the defendant's bankruptcy discharge did not
entitle plaintiff's uninsured motorist carrier to be dismissed as a
party.13 2 The important distinction, according to the court of appeals,
was that the uninsured motorist carrier had been served in the action,
was a party, and had filed the motion for summary judgment, unlike the
insurer in the present case."3 The Georgia Supreme Court in Wilkinson held that the uninsured motorist carrier's potential liability
in existence under its contract with its insured, the plainremained
4
13

tiff.

The court of appeals apparently held that defendant's liability
insurer's position was different because it was not a party.r This
reasoning seems flawed because an uninsured motorist carrier is free to
answer, when served, in its own name as a party or in the name of the
tortfeasor.'34 Surely the court did not mean that even an uninsured
motorist insurer could escape liability if it had simply remained a
nonparty.
Presiding Judge Birdsong authored a cogent dissent in which he
pointed out the unjust and untenable result worked by the majority." 7
The dissent pointed out that defendant-insured's personal bankruptcy
discharge did not excuse the insurer from its contractual liability as to
the driver of the car:
Now, however, the majority has declared that there [sic] this contracted-for insurance coverage of Pauline Walker's car is not available to the
plaintiffs, because the majority has converted Pauline Walker's motion
to dismiss to a summary judgment and the trial court's dismissal to a
final judgment merely because it examined a federal court document
and supporting affidavit, and because there is at this stage no evidence
in the record that Pauline Walker had insurance.'38

130. Id. at 656, 485 S.E.2d at 254-55.
131. 236 Ga. 456, 224 S.E.2d 167 (1976).
132. 225 Ga. App. at 656, 485 S.E.2d at 255.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. The trial court was affirmed by four members of the court of appeals (Beasley,
J., Andrews, C.J., Johnson, J., and Smith, J.). Id. Four members dissented as to the
affirmance (McMurray, J., Birdsong, J., Pope, P.J., and Blackburn, J.). Id. One member
did not participate (Ruffin, J.). Id
136. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(d) (Supp. 1997).
137. 225 Ga. App. at 658, 485 S.E.2d at 256 (Birdsong, P.J., dissenting).
138. Id
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The dissent argued forcibly that the appeal should have been dismissed
so that the trial court could resolve on the merits the liability of the
driver of the car. 9
The insurance company should not be allowed to reap a windfall at the
expense of an innocent victim merely because of the financial irresponsibility of its insured. It is indeed ironic that this result effectively holds
that insurance purchased to protect one's assets is lost because one has
already lost one's assets.
Canal Insurance"4° is another case that works an unjust and untenable result. The issue was whether plaintiffs should be deprived of their
rights under the Georgia Direct Action Statute 4 to sue the insurance
company directly when there was evidence that the insurance company
intentionally failed to register the insurance policy of its motor contract
carrier with the Georgia Public Service Commission ("PSC"). The case
arose out of an automobile collision between plaintiff and a tractortrailer that was insured by Canal Insurance. Plaintiffs brought suit
against the tractor-trailer driver, owner, and insurance company. The
owner of the tractor-trailer never filed for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity with the PSC and never filed a bond or
insurance policy even though it was legally required to do so. In
addition, Canal Insurance did not file a Form E certificate of insurance
with the PSC.
The trial court denied Canal's motion for summary
142

judgment.

Looking to the recent case of Southern General Insurance Co. v.
Waymond,' 4 the court of appeals reasserted that "under the unambiguous terms of the statute, as construed in Glenn McClendon Trucking
Co. v. Williams,'" a plaintiff must prove that a policy was filed and
approved by the PSC in order to maintain a direct action against the
insurer of a motor contract carrier.""* Therefore, the court concluded
that plaintiffs could not assert a direct action against Canal Insurance
because the insurance policy issued to the tractor-trailer owner was
never filed with or approved by the PSC."

139. Id.
140. 222 Ga. App. 539, 474 S.E.2d 732 (1996).
141. O.C.G.A. § 46-7-12 (Supp. 1997).
142. 222 Ga. App. at 540, 474 S.E.2d at 732.
143. 221 Ga. App. 613, 472 S.E.2d 325 (1996).
144. 183 Ga. App. 508, 359 S.E.2d 351 (1987).
145. 222 Ga. App. at 540, 474 S.E.2d at 733 (quoting Waymond, 221 Ga. App. 613, 472
S.E.2d 325 (1996)).
146, Id.
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Again, in this case the special concurrence argued forcibly against the
"inequities which arise under the present statutory scheme for allowing
a direct action against the insurer."147 The concurrence pointed out
that under the present statute, an essential element of the plaintiff's
claim is to show that the carrier fulfilled its obligation to file a bond or
insurance policy; furthermore, there is no statutory obligation imposed
on the insurer to file proof of the policy." s These conditions subvert
the purpose of the statute: "'to protect the public against injuries caused
by the motor carrier's negligence.'"14
Using common sense, the
concurrence called upon the legislature to remedy this situation:
To impose the filing obligation on [the carrier owner] ignores the
reality of the insurer and carrier relationship: the insurer maintains
the copy of the policy, and the insurers are more aware of the filing
requirements than many of the carriers. Canal's evasion here was not
intended by the statute." °
In another case involving proper parties to an action, Gordon v.
Walker,' the court of appeals decided that the wife of a decedent was
entitled to bring an action even though she was not the named
administrator of the decedent's estate at the time she filed the action but
was named administrator prior to the filing of defendants' motion to
dismiss." 2 In Gordon the common-law wife of a deceased bus passenger brought an action against MARTA and a MARTA bus driver. The
trial court granted a motion to dismiss two counts of plaintiffs
claims-for medical expenses and pain and suffering-on the grounds
that those claims could only be maintained by the personal representative of the estate and that plaintiff was not the administrator of the
estate when she filed the complaint.'
This case demonstrates the necessity for litigators to have probate
matters resolved, if possible, before bringing a lawsuit. Plaintiff's
husband's injuries occurred on November 1, 1991, and he subsequently
died (not as a result of those injuries). On June 7, 1993, Mrs. Gordon
was granted an "[olrder from the Probate Court, declaring no administration necessary" with regard to the estate.'5
Plaintiff filed her
original lawsuit on November 1, 1993. She later dismissed that action

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. (Pope, P.J., concurring specially).
Id. at 541, 474 S.E.2d at 733.
Id. (quoting Andrews v. Yellow Freight Sys., 262 Ga. 476, 421 S.E.2d 712 (1992)).
Id., 474 S.E.2d at 734.
224 Ga. App. 861, 482 S.E.2d 489 (1997).
Id. at 861-62, 482 S.E.2d at 490.
Id. at 861, 482 S.E.2d at 490.
Id.
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and filed a properly renewed action on February 23, 1995. She filed
both actions
in her capacities as wife and administratrix of the
155
estate.
Plaintiff was actually appointed administratrix of the estate on
November 21, 1995, some nine months after filing the complaint. On
December 19, 1995, defendants moved to dismiss certain counts of the
complaint, asserting that plaintiff lacked standing to bring those claims.
Although plaintiff submitted a copy of her Letters of Administration and
contended that the motion to dismiss was moot, the trial court granted
the motion."
The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with plaintiff. Relying on
Walden v. John D. Archbold Memorial Hospital,'5 7 the court pointed
out that the "administrator" should be treated as an "indispensable
party" who should be joined, if possible, under O.C.G.A. section 9-1117.11 The court distinguished Walden, in which the dismissal was
affirmed, because in that case the administrator was not among the
plaintiffs who initially brought suit and the administrator was not
named until five months after the trial court dismissed the complaint. 59 In Gordon plaintiff had already been named administrator
at the time defendants brought their motion to dismiss; therefore, the
court held that "at that point, the action was being prosecuted by the
real party in interest.""6
Another case in which the main issue involved the plaintiffs status as
real party in interest was Watson/ Winter Joint Venture v. Milledge.'6 '
The named plaintiff was a joint venture construction contractor who
brought suit against subcontractors. The trial was a bench trial, and at
the close of plaintiff's case, defendant Milledge moved for a directed
verdict challenging plaintiff's status as real party in interest under
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-17(a). 62 The trial court found not only that
there was no evidence that the named plaintiff was a legal entity but
also that the erroneous naming of plaintiff in the pleadings and on the
underlying contract was not an "amendable defect" that would provide
The trial court granted defendant's
for retroactive correction."

155. I&
166. Id.
157. 197 Ga. App. 275, 398 S.E.2d 271 (1990). The court noted that this case was
apparently never cited to the trial court. Id.
158. 224 Ga. App. at 861-62, 482 S.E.2d at 490.
159. Id. at 862, 482 S.E.2d at 490.
160. Id.
161. 224 Ga. App. 395, 480 S.E.2d 389 (1997).
162. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-17(a) (1993).
163. 224 Ga. App. at 396, 480 S.E.2d at 390.
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motion for directed verdict and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with
prejudice.'16
The court of appeals pointed out that "'[anaction may be maintained
by and in the name of any unincorporated organization or associaThe appeals court found that even assuming as correct the
tion.'"
factual determination that the named joint venture was not a legal
entity, that finding did not itself authorize the dismissal with prejudice
under defendant's challenge pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-17(a).'6
That statute provides in part that "[n]o action shall be dismissed on the
ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest
until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification
of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real
party in interest." 67 While recognizing that in Georgia "'a joint
venture is not a distinct legal entity separate and apart from the parties
composing it,'"'" the real parties in interest were the entities that
constituted the joint venture."e Under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-17, those
parties should have been provided a reasonable opportunity to ratify or
join the action or, on proper motion, should have been permitted to be
joined or substituted in accordance with O.C.G.A. section 9-11-19(a).1 70
Finally, one other case involving proper claims in an action deals with
third-party practice. The issue arose in Shleifer v. Bridgestone-Firestone,
Inc., 71 in which plaintiff sued the Shleifers for injuries caused by a
collision in which Shleifer was driving. Firestone had recently performed brake work on the Shleifer car. The Shleifers filed a third-party
complaint under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-14(a) against Firestone alleging
that brake failure caused the collision and seeking indemnity and
contribution. The Shleifers amended their third-party complaint to add
a direct claim against Firestone for property damage to their own car.
Firestone contended that the third-party plaintiff could not join a claim
in the impleader action that did not affect the original plaintiff-in
essence, that only a claim that would be a proper basis for impleader
could be joined in the action. The trial court agreed and dismissed the

164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting O.C.GA. § 9-2-24 (1982)).
166. Id
167. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-17(a).
168. 224 Ga. App. at 397, 480 S.E.2d at 391 (quoting Boatman v. George Hyman
Constr. Co., 157 Ga. App. 120, 123, 276 S.E.2d 272, 275 (1981)).
169. Id.
170. Id
See O.C.GJ.A § 9-11-19(a) (1993) (joinder of parties needed for just
adjudication).
171. 223 Ga. App. 256, 477 S.E.2d 405 (1996).
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dismiss for
amended third-party complaint on Firestone's motion to 172
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The court of appeals reversed 7 ' and stated the following:
Having been brought into the suit, the plain language of the statute
concerning joinder of claims indicates that the claim may be added: "A
party asserting a claim to relief as... [a] third-party claim may join,

as independent claims, as many claims, legal or equitable, as he has
against an opposing party. O.C.G.A. [section] 9-11-18(a)."174
The court noted the general rule that a third-party claimant can join
independent claims and also noted that a claim that is properly joined
need not be tried together with175other claims if fairness or convenience
justifies separating the claims.
Firestone relied on Michaels v. Kessler 76 for the proposition that the
court must affirm the decision of the trial court if that court did not
abuse its discretion. 77 The court of appeals rejected this argument,
stating that Michaels upheld the court's discretion to sever claims under
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-42(b) but did not state that the trial court had
discretion to dismiss proper claims in the first place or to reject joinder
of claims under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-18(a). 17 The court of appeals
found no authority for the proposition that joinder under O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-18(a) is discretionary and held that the trial court may
sever trial of direct claims from the secondary claims but may not
dismiss the amended complaint merely because it contains properly
joined issues that the court would prefer to sever.7 9
E. Dismissal of Actions
One notable case involving the subject of voluntary dismissals serves
as a warning to those who may seek a voluntary dismissal after a
settlement has been reached and announced in open court. In Leary v.
s the parties reached a settlement before trial, and the
Julian,"
attorneys for both sides announced the settlement terms before the
court. The court reduced the settlement to a written order on February

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 256, 477 S.E.2d at 406. See O.C.GA. § 9-11-12(bX6) (1993).
223 Ga. App. at 258, 477 S.E.2d at 407.
Id. at 256, 477 S.E.2d at 406 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-18(a) (1993)).
Id. (citing Huff v. Valentine, 217 Ga. App. 310,311-12,457 S.E.2d 249,250 (1995)

and O.C.GA. § 9-11-42(b) (1993)).
176. 191 Ga. App. 103, 381 S.E.2d 103 (1989).
177. 223 Ga. App. at 256-57, 477 S.E.2d at 406.

178. Id. at 257, 477 S.E.2d at 406.
179. Id. at 257-58, 477 S.E.2d at 407.
180. 225 Ga. App. 472, 484 S.E.2d 75 (1997).
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26, 1996. However, three days before the order was filed, plaintiff filed
a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, apparently in contravention of
Defendant subsequently filed a
the settlement arrangement.18'
contempt action against plaintiff, alleging that he was violating the
terms of the court-ordered settlement. Plaintiff asserted that his
voluntary dismissal rendered182the order void. The trial court found
plaintiff in willfull contempt.
The Georgia Code provides that a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss a
claim before resting his or her case."8' The rule, however, is that a
voluntary dismissal is precluded as soon as the trial court announces a
The
finding, judgment, or decision that terminates the litigation.'
court of appeals pointed out that "[wihen a judicial determination is
made in open court, there is no requirement that its substance be
memorialized in writing or reduced to an order to be effective against the
parties or the plaintiff's right to dismiss the claim."'" Moreover, the
knowledge of actual, as opposed to possible, conclusion of the litigation
Finally, "[a] finding,
will preclude a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal.'
judgment, or decision will terminate a given case when it is 'the
equivalent of a verdict.'"'87
Thus, the issue before the court in the instant case was whether
participation in the agreed-upon, open-court settlement was the
equivalent of a verdict. Pointing out that settlement agreements are
highly favored in Georgia and that oral settlements are enforceable if the
parties' attorneys are vested with authority to enter into these agreements and do so before the court, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that
a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a) may not be filed after all
parties to an action announce a settlement agreement in open court and
the trial court adopts the terms of the agreement in an oral order, even
if that order is not reduced to writing until a later time.M The court
made it clear that its holding applies to undisputed settlement agreements whose terms are not questioned by the parties.' 9

181. Id. at 472-73, 484 S.E.2d at 76.
182. Id. at 473, 484 S.E.2d at 76.
183. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a) (1993) ('[A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff,
without order or permission of court, by filing a written notice of dismissal at any time
before the plaintiff rests.").
184. 225 Ga. App. at 473, 484 S.E.2d at 77 (citing Jones v. Burton, 238 Ga. 394, 396,
233 S.E.2d 367, 368 (1977)).
185. Id. (citing Jones, 238 Ga. 394, 233 S.E.2d 367).
186. Id.
187. Id. (quoting Bytell v. Paul, 173 Ga. App. 83, 84, 325 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1984)).
188. Id at 474, 484 S.E.2d at 77.
189. Id.
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The court of appeals decided another case involving the application
of dismissals under Rule 41 in this survey period, but this case included
the complication of an uninsured motorist carrier's cross-claim.'" The
insured plaintiff in Thomas v. Auto Owners Insurance Co. sued the
driver of a vehicle that was involved in a collision with her. Plaintiff
also served the suit on her uninsured-underinsured motorist ("U.M.")
carrier, which then filed a cross-claim against the driver-defendant for
indemnification. Plaintiff settled with defendant-driver prior to trial,
and the court dismissed her complaint against him with prejudice.
Importantly, the U.M. carrier did not contest or object to the dismissal.
Defendant-driver moved to dismiss or for summary judgment on the
cross-claim. The trial court denied the motion. 1
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals found that the U.M.
carrier's lack of objection to plaintiff's dismissal of defendant-driver
resulted in the entire action, including the cross-claim, being dismissed
with prejudice against the driver.'" The court relied on the rule that
"'if a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service
upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be
dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can
remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.'""" The
court applied the rule to cross-claims as well as counterclaims under the
authority of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-41(c)." 4 The court held that "by
virtue of the [U.M. carrier's] failure to object, [plaintiff's] dismissal
terminated the entire action including the cross-claim."'
A final case to note in the area of dismissals is Little v. Fleet
The case arose over plaintiff's unsuccessful bid at a
Finance.'
foreclosure sale for a piece of property. The trial court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's fraud claim for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. One finding of the trial court
was that plaintiff's fraud claim failed because damages for loss of profit
as alleged in the complaint were too remote and speculative to sustain
this claim. 97
The court of appeals held that "the speculative nature of damages
alleged in a complaint may not afford a basis for the granting of a

190. Thomas v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 221 Ga. App. 815, 472 S.E.2d 707 (1996).
191. Id. at 815-16, 472 S.E.2d at 708.
192. Id, 472 S.E.2d at 709.
193. I&, 472 S.E.2d at 708 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a) (1993)).
194. d.; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(c) (providing that this code section applies to the dismissal
of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim).
195. 221 Ga. App. at 815-16, 472 S.E.2d at 709.
196. 224 Ga. App. 498, 481 S.E.2d 552 (1997).
197. Id. at 499, 481 S.E.2d at 555.
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motion to dismiss" when the trial court takes the allegations of a
complaint as true.'98 The court also noted that the trial court ignored
a jury could find as a result of the
the issue of nominal damages, which
199
commission of an unlawful act.
Discovery Practice
As usual, the area of trial practice dealing with discovery in civil cases
generated quite a few cases for the Georgia appellate courts.

F

1. Discovery of Financial Information. The court of appeals had
occasion to address discovery of a defendant's financial information in a
punitive damages case in Ledee v. Devoe.2" Plaintiff brought a suit
against defendant and two attorneys for conspiracy, fraud, negligence,
and breach of fiduciary duty in the handling of her personal injury case,
that was dismissed for want of prosecution and not renewed. Plaintiff
claimed that defendant Ledee held himself out as an attorney, which he
was not. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that his
actions were not the proximate cause of plaintiff's damages. Defendant
simultaneously moved for a protective order staying further discovery
until his motion for summary judgment was decided and specifically
sought protection from producing copies of his tax returns. The trial
court denied the motion for protective order, ordered that he sit for a
deposition, and required that he answer plaintiff's discovery. Plaintiff
served defendant with a notice to take his deposition and attached a
subpoena duces tecum that sought more financial information. 1 She
also served second interrogatories seeking further financial information.
Defendant moved again for a protective order, for reconsideration of the
prior order, and to quash the subpoena. After oral argument, the trial
court denied the motions and issued an order in which it found that

198. Id. at 500, 481 S.E.2d at 556.
199. Id. The court did affirm the dismissal based on other reasons not addressed here.
Id at 504, 481 S.E.2d at 558.
200. 225 Ga. App. 620, 484 S.E.2d 344 (1997).
201. Id. at 621, 484 S.E.2d at 345-46. The plaintiffs subpoena contained five
enumerated requests, including the following:
1. The last five financial statements prepared by you, for you, or for any company
in which you have a financial interest; ... 3. All federal and state income tax
returns submitted by you ... for each of the last five years; 4. Each and every
bank statement (including all checking, savings and other such accounts) in which
you maintained an account on [date] ....
Id. at 621-22, 484 S.E.2d at 346.
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plaintiff had
made a prima facie showing of entitlement to punitive
20 2
damages.
The issue before the court of appeals was whether plaintiff was
required, as contended by defendant, to make a showing of a causal
connection between plaintiff's injuries and defendant's actions first
before being allowed discovery of defendant's financial circumstances.
The court stated that a mere demand for punitive damages does not
authorize the type of discovery sought by plaintiff.' While acknowledging that the trial court had determined that plaintiff had made out
a prima facie case for punitive damages, the court of appeals noted that
the trial court had not ruled on the summary judgment motion claiming
that defendant had not caused plaintiff's damages as a matter of law
and also noted that the record did not indicate that plaintiff had made
an evidentiary showing that a factual basis existed for her punitive
damages claim.2'
The court of appeals held that mere allegations in the complaint and
representations by counsel (and apparently by the trial court) will not
suffice; there must be an evidentiary showing. 0' Although the court
stated that a ruling on the summary judgment motion would be
determinative of plaintiff's right to the discovery, the court was also
quick to point out that a ruling on a motion for summary judgment is
not always required in such a discovery dispute: "It is enough if a
plaintiff supports her claim to this kind of discovery with affidavits,
discovery responses, or other evidence sufficient to show that an
evidentiary basis exists for the punitive damages claim."' The court
also made a point of stating that even if discovery of a defendant's
worldly circumstances and business relationships is authorized, the
discovery is not unlimited, and the trial court is obligated to assure that
there is no unreasonable intrusion into the defendant's privacy by
carefully balancing both parties' interests. 7 The court seemingly
ignored the time-honored principle that appellate courts presume a trial
court's ruling to have been supported by evidence absent proof to the
contrary by the party claiming error.208

202. Id. at 623, 484 S.E.2d at 347.
203. Id. at 624, 484 S.E.2d at 347.
204. Id. (citing Holman v. Burgess, 199 Ga. App. 61, 404 S.E.2d 144 (1991)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 624-25, 484 S.E.2d at 348 (citation omitted).
207. Id. at 625, 484 S.E.2d at 348.
208. Goodman v. Lake Buckhorn Estates Home Owners Assoc., 224 Ga. App. 765, 767,
481 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1997).
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2. Withdrawal of Admissions. Two cases of note during the
survey period concerned whether a party should be allowed to withdraw
admissions. First, in Walker v. Sutton,' ° the court of appeals applied
the principle of estoppel to preclude the withdrawal of admissions."'
The case arose from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on November
16, 1989. Plaintiff sued defendant Sutton, the truck owner, and
defendant Willis, his driver. After suit was filed, defendant Sutton
answered on November 26, 1991, stating that he was the owner of the
logging truck involved in the collision and that Willis, the driver, was
acting in the scope of his employment with Sutton at the time of the
collision. Sutton admitted the same facts in response to the plaintiff's
interrogatories and stipulated in the pretrial order filed on May 20, 1993
that at the time of the wreck, Sutton's vehicle was being operated by
Willis, who was acting as Sutton's employee. Only after a jury had been
selected in January 1994 did Sutton advise the trial court that a search
of his business records revealed that he had sold the truck several weeks
before the wreck and that his payroll records revealed that Willis
stopped being his employee several weeks before the wreck.2 '
Based on this information, the trial court discharged the jury.
Defendant filed a motion to withdraw admissions and amend his answer
and a motion to amend the pretrial order. Plaintiff filed a motion
asserting that defendant should not be allowed to repudiate, change, or
withdraw his admissions. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion and
granted defendant's motions. Sutton thereafter moved for summary
judgment, asserting that he was not the truck owner and the driver was
not his employee. The trial court granted that motion as well. 2
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in
allowing defendant to withdraw his admissions and amend his answer
and the pretrial order.2"' The court found that defendant was estopped from tardily contradicting his answer, interrogatory responses,
and the pretrial order because of plaintiffs reliance to her detriment.21 4 In making its decision, the court found that defendant's
admissions had misled plaintiff and had precluded her from bringing
suit against the alleged true owner of the vehicle because the statute of
limitations had expired prior to defendant's coming forward with his

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

222 Ga. App. 638, 476 S.E.2d 34 (1996).
Id. at 639, 476 S.E.2d at 36.
Id. at 638, 476 S.E.2d at 35-36.
Id. at 638-39, 476 S.E.2d at 36.
Id. at 639, 476 S.E.2d at 36.
Id.; see O.C.G.A. § 24-4-24(bX8) (1995).
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newly discovered information.21 The court of appeals further held
that defendant could not withdraw or amend his admissions because he
could not show that the merits of the case would be subserved.1 6
In another case in which a party sought to withdraw admissions,
Howell v. Styles,2 17 the issue was whether plaintiff's requests for
admissions of fact were valid if the attorney who signed the requests was
not authorized to practice law. The pro se defendant, upon whom the
complaint and requests were filed, answered the complaint and attached
a copy of a notarized letter from the State Bar of Georgia that purported
to certify that the plaintiff's attorney was ineligible to practice law in
Georgia due to nonpayment of his license fee for 1993 to 1994.
Defendant did not respond to the requests for admissions. Plaintiff,
through another attorney, subsequently ified a motion for summary
judgment on the ground that defendant had failed to respond to the
requests for admissions. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw
admissions and responded to the summary judgment motion, asserting
that the requests were void because the attorney who signed them was
not authorized to practice law. The trial court denied defendant's motion
21
to withdraw admissions and granted summary judgment to plaintiff.

The court of appeals reversed and remanded. 9
The court of appeals agreed that whether plaintiff's attorney was
authorized to practice law at the time he signed and served the requests
for admissions was relevant to the issue of whether the trial court
should have allowed defendant to withdraw admissions.220 Under
state bar rules, a person may not practice law in Georgia unless that
person is an active member of the bar in good standing. 1 A member
is not deemed to be in good standing if found delinquent in payments of
the license fee after September 1 of any year.222 In light of these state
bar rules, the court of appeals concluded that an attorney who is not in
good standing because he failed to pay his license fee is unauthorized to
practice law in Georgia. 2'
Accordingly, the court stated that if
plaintiff's attorney was not authorized to practice law when the requests
were signed and served by him, then the requests were a nullity, and

215. 222 Ga. App. at 639, 476 S.E.2d at 36.

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 640, 476 S.E.2d at 36.
221 Ga. App. 781, 472 S.E.2d 548 (1996).
Id. at 781, 472 S.E.2d at 549.
Id. at 781-82, 472 S.E.2d at 549.
Id at 784, 472 S.E.2d at 551.

221. See GA. STATE BAR R. 1-203.
222. See GA. STATE BAR R. 1-204.
223. 221 Ga. App. at 783, 472 S.E.2d at 551.
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The court of
defendant was not obligated to respond to them.'
appeals remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether the
attorney was authorized to practice law at the time the requests for
admission were signed and served.2"
3. Pre-Complaint Depositions. In St. Joseph Hospital Augusta,
Georgia, Inc. v. Black,"' plaintiff sought to take the deposition of the
chief executive officer of St. Joseph Hospital prior to filing a complaint
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-27(a) in order to perpetuate the
testimony. Plaintiff believed that the CEO had information concerning
hospital policies and the hospital's decision to grant a certain doctor staff
privileges that would aid her in preparing an expert affidavit attesting
to the hospital's negligence in an anticipated medical malpractice suit.
The trial court granted plaintiff's petition.2 7 Quoting Worley v.
Worley,228 the court of appeals reiterated the following:
[T]he purpose of O.C.G.A. [section] 9-11-27(a) is to provide for
perpetuation of testimony in situations where, for one reason or
another, testimony might be lost to a prospective litigant unless steps
are taken immediately to preserve and protect such testimony.
O.C.G.A. [section] 9-11-27(a) does not provide a substitute for discovery
or a method to determine whether a cause of action exists. This code
section cannot be used for the purpose of ascertaining facts to be used
in drafting a complaint.m
The appellate court noted that plaintiff did not allege the testimony
sought was in any danger of being lost nor that the testimony would be
unavailable after the complaint was filed.28 0 Because the entire
purpose of the precomplaint deposition was to enable plaintiff to
ascertain facts to be used in preparing her complaint, the petition should
have been denied according to the court of appeals." 1 The court stated
22
that "[dliscovery is not required to prepare a malpractice affidavit."
4. Discovery Sanctions. Always fertile ground for appeal is a trial
court's utilization of dismissal or default judgment as a sanction for

224. Id. at 784, 472 S.E.2d at 551.
225.

Id.

226. 225 Ga. App. 139, 483 S.E.2d 290 (1997).
227. Id. at 139, 483 S.E.2d at 290.
228. 161 Ga. App. 44, 288 S.E.2d 854 (1982).
229.

S.E.2d
230.
231.
232.

225 Ga. App. at 139, 483 S.E.2d at 291 (quoting Worley, 161 Ga. App. at 45, 288

at 856).
Id.
Id at 140, 483 S.E.2d at 291.
Id
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discovery abuse. One case is notable for its application of sanctions to
the parties' failure to attend depositions. In Washington v. South
Georgia Medical Center,' plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought an
action against South Georgia Medical Center and Dr. Roy Swindle for
medical malpractice. One defendant, Swindle, noticed the depositions
of plaintiffs, but plaintiffs failed to appear at the depositions. Both
Swindle and the hospital separately moved for sanctions. The trial court
scheduled and noticed a hearing on the two motions, but plaintiffs did
not attend. The trial court took the matter under advisement thirty-four
days after the doctor's motion for sanctions was filed and thirty days
after the hospital's motion was filed and signed an order dismissing
plaintiffs' action based on their "willful failure to attend their depositions." 2" Plaintiffs filed a written response to defendants' motions on
the day the order was signed. The response was untimely as to the
doctor's motion but was timely as to the hospital's motion.'
The court of appeals relied on the general rule pertaining to sanctions:
There is no requirement that the plaintiff display and the trial court
find actual wilfulness. The sanction of dismissal for failure to comply
with discovery provisions of the Civil Practice Act requires only a
conscious or intentional failure to act, as distinguished from an
accidental or involuntary non-compliance. A conscious or intentional
failure to act is in fact wilful.
Applying this rule to the facts in the record, which showed that plaintiffs
had failed to respond to letters from the doctor concerning their
depositions, had failed to attend the depositions, had failed to respond
timely to the doctor's motion for sanctions, and had failed to attend the
hearing, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court could
determine that plaintiffs' failure to comply with the doctor's discovery
was intentional. 7 However, the court reversed the dismissal as to the
claims against the hospital because the trial court did not consider
plaintiffs' response to the hospital, which they had filed on the last
possible day.2 s
This case is most notable for the court of appeals decision that the
trial court could consider and even grant on remand the hospital's
motion for sanctions for the failure of plaintiffs to attend their deposi233. 221 Ga. App. 640, 472 S.E.2d 328 (1996).
234. Id. at 640, 472 S.E.2d at 328-29.
235. Id. at 640-41, 472 S.E.2d at 329.
236. Id. at 641, 472 S.E.2d at 329 (quoting Stolle v. State Farm Ins. Co., 206 Ga. App.
235, 236, 424 S.E.2d 807, 809 (1992)).
237. Id., 472 S.E.2d at 330.
238. Id. at 642, 472 S.E.2d at 330.
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tions despite the fact that the depositions were noticed by a codefendant
The majority distinguished
but not by the defendant hospital.2
Singleton v. Eastern Carriers,2" relied upon by the special concurrence, because that case "concerned a plaintiff's failure to respond to
written discovery propounded by the movant's co-defendant rather than
a failure to attend a deposition noticed by the movant's co-defendant."24 The court of appeals concluded that the difference between
written discovery and a deposition (the movant in the written discovery
scenario had suffered no expense of preparation or attendance as a
result of the plaintiff's failure to answer interrogatories as opposed to a
deposition) justified the imposition of sanctions even when the deposition
was not noticed by the party moving for sanctions. 242 The court stated,
"All parties similarly situated, who have been damaged by a party's
failure to attend a properly noticed deposition, should be entitled to rely
on the failing party to follow the law and attend his deposition
Chief
regardless of which party originally noticed the deposition."
Judge Beasley, in a special concurrence, disagreed with this proposition
and opined that the hospital could not obtain sanctions for plaintiffs'
The
failure to attend depositions not requested by the hospital.'
concurrence pointed out that "[itis a simple thing to give notice" and
that the remedy of sanctions is provided for the party who has been
wronged."
G.

Choice of Law
A Georgia Supreme Court case in the area of trial practice and
procedure involved choice of law. Alexander v. General Motors Corp.2'
is an important decision for its impact on protecting Georgians' rights
under Georgia law. Alexander, a Georgia resident, purchased a new
General Motors ("GM") vehicle in Georgia, but he was injured while
driving in Virginia when the driver's seat of the vehicle failed in a
collision and he was ejected. Alexander brought suit against GM in
Georgia under a theory of strict product liability. The trial court granted
partial summary judgment to GM. Because the tort injuries occurred in
Virginia, Virginia substantive law would normally apply under the rule

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
192 Ga. App. 227, 384 S.E.2d 202 (1989).
221 Ga. App. at 642, 472 S.E.2d at 330.
Id., 472 S.E.2d at 330-31.
Id., 472 S.E.2d at 330.
Id. at 643, 472 S.E.2d at 331 (Beasley, C.J., concurring specially).
Id.
267 Ga. 339, 478 S.E.2d 123 (1996).
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of lex loci delicti. Virginia law does not provide for strict liability
actions, so the trial court dismissed Alexander's strict liability claims
and permitted Alexander to amend his complaint to state a negligence
claim under Virginia law.247
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court,
finding that "Virginia products liability law is not radically dissimilar to
Georgia law" and pursues similar public policy by different methods so
that the Virginia law does not contravene Georgia public policy.'
Therefore, the court of appeals refused to apply the public policy
exception to the rule of lex loci delicti.'
Because Virginia does not recognize recovery on the basis of strict
liability, the issue before the Georgia Supreme Court was whether the
application of the rule of lex loci delicti would contravene the public
policy embodied in Georgia's O.C.G.A. section 5 1 _1_ 1 1 . 250 The supreme
court answered that question 25in
the affirmative and reversed the
1
decision of the court of appeals.
In a short and succinct opinion, the supreme court pointed out the
differences in Virginia law and Georgia law and the impact those
differences have on Georgia citizens:2 2
[T]he conclusion.., that Virginia products liability law is not radically
dissimilar to Georgia law but rather pursues a similar public policy by
somewhat different methods, misses the crucial point that Georgia's
public policy of shifting to manufacturers the burden of loss caused by

defective products is effectuated by precisely those somewhat different
methods.'

247. Id. at 339, 478 S.E.2d at 123.
248. Alexander v. General Motors Corp., 219 Ga. App. 660, 661, 466 S.E.2d 607, 609
(1995), vacated, 224 Ga. App. 238, 481 S.E.2d 7 (1997).
249. Id.
250. 267 Ga. at 339,478 S.E.2d at 123. O.C.G.A. section 51-1-11(bX1) (1997) provides
the following:
[that the] manufacturer of any personal, property sold as new property ... shall
be liable in tort, irrespective of privity, to any natural person who may use,
consume, or reasonably be affected by the property and who suffers injury to his
person or property because the property when sold by the manufacturer was not
merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended, and its condition when
sold is the proximate cause of the injury sustained.
251. 267 Ga. at 339-40, 478 S.E.2d at 123.
252. Id. at 340, 478 S.E.2d at 124. An example of the differences found in the two
states' laws is a notification requirement in Virginia's warranty law that is not required
under Georgia's strict liability law.
253. Id. (citations omitted).
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The court noted, as one example, that a Virginia negligence claim
differs from a Georgia strict liability claim because Georgia law
eliminates questions of negligence and the usual defenses to negligence. 2 " The supreme court found that a comparison of the laws
demonstrated that the Virginia law and Georgia law are "radically
dissimilar in terms of the burden placed on persons seeking recompense
for injuries caused by defective products.' 2 "
The supreme court found that applying Virginia law was contrary to
the public policy of Georgia (as expressed by O.C.G.A. section 51-1-11)
of protecting those injured by defective products placed in the stream of
commerce in this state and ordered that Georgia law be applied to
Alexander's claims against GM. 2m
H.

Trial Procedure

In another Georgia Supreme Court decision, the court was called upon
to apply a provision of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. section
9-11-42(a),2 5 7 which addresses consolidation of trials and joint trials. 2 " In Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 259 plaintiff-son and
plaintiffs-parents filed separate lawsuits against Uniroyal for injuries
sustained in an automobile collision. The trial court ordered that the
two actions begin on the same day with separate juries empaneled for
each case to hear all common evidence. Both juries found Uniroyal
liable for compensatory damages, but only one jury found Uniroyal liable
The court of appeals reversed both acfor punitive damages.2'
tions.2"' The issue before the supreme court was whether parties who
do not agree to consolidation of related cases may be required to try the
cases together before separate juries. •The Georgia Code provides in
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-42(a) ("Rule 42(a)") that:
[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, if the parties consent, the court may order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may
order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 340-41, 478 S.E.2d at 124.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-42(a) (1993).
Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 267 Ga. 226, 476 S.E.2d 565 (1996).
267 Ga. 226, 476 S.E.2d 565 (1996).
I& at 226, 476 S.E.2d at 567.
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford, 218 Ga. App. 248,461 S.E.2d 877 (1995), reu'd

in part, 267 Ga. 226, 476 S.E.2d 565 (1996).
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concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs
262

or delay.

Prior to the trial, Uniroyal had moved to consolidate the actions under
this statute, but plaintiffs did not consent and opposed the motion.
Thus, the trial court ordered that two juries hear substantially the same
evidence in the same courtroom at the same time. Uniroyal opposed
that procedure. The court of appeals reversed on other grounds but
affirmed the order directing a dual jury trial.2
The supreme court found that the procedure directed by the trial court
was neither a consolidated action nor a joint trial under O.C.G.A. section
9-11-42(a) because of the presence of two separate juries but was a
similar "dual jury trial.'" The court found this distinction between
the procedures to be insufficient to preclude Rule 42(a) from governing
and held that Rule 42(a) applies to the dual jury trial and other
procedures that combine separate actions in joint court proceedings.'
Therefore, the parties must consent before a trial court may consolidate
The court noted that the consent
or join related actions for trial.'
rule conflicts with the objective of the consolidation rule-to give the
trial court broad discretion in controlling its docket-and seemed to take
issue with the litigants' control over this matter.
A second case concerning the conduct of a trial was Boyett v. WebBoyett involved a personal injury action arising from an
ster.2'
automobile collision in which defendant was driving under the influence
of alcohol. Plaintiff asserted claims for compensatory and punitive
damages, alleging that defendant's driving while grossly intoxicated
showed wilfullness, wantonness, and a conscious disregard for the
foreseeable consequences of his actions. The case was bifurcated so that
the first phase concerned liability for compensatory damages, amount of

262.

O.C.G-A. § 9-1142(a).

263. 267 Ga. at 226-27, 476 S.E.2d at 567.
264. Id at 228, 476 S.E.2d at 568. The court cited Black's Law Dictionary for
definitions of consolidated actions and joint trials:
consolidation [is] the act of "uniting several actions into one trial and judgment
... where all the actions are between the same parties, pending in the same court,
and involving substantially the same subject-matter, issues, and defenses." Ajoint
trial is defined as a "trial of two or more persons ... conducted within the
framework of one trial."

Id.
265.
266.
267.
268.
(1997).

Id.
Id. at 229, 476 S.E.2d at 568.
Id. at 230, 476 S.E.2d at 569.
224 Ga. App. 843, 482 S.E.2d 377 (1996), cert. granted, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 576
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compensatory damages, and liability for punitive damages. The second
phase of the trial was to involve the amount, if any, of punitive damages
to be awarded. Plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of a prior DUI of
defendant in phase one of the trial. However, the trial court granted
defendant's motion in limine to exclude that evidence in the first phase
in spite of plaintiff's argument that the evidence was directly relevant
to the issue of liability for punitive damages. The jury returned a
verdict for compensatory damages but not punitive damages.2
The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding the evidence of defendant's prior DUI when only the amount
of punitive damages was bifurcated from the other issues. ° The court
of appeals recognized that the amount of punitive damages must be tried
separately from liability under O.C.G.A. section 51-12-5.1. 271 However,
the court found it to be an abuse of discretion both to bifurcate the trial
and exclude evidence relevant to liability for punitive damages from the
first phase.Y While it is generally true in suits for negligence that
evidence of acts or omissions on other occasions is not admissible, an
exception applies to allow admission when defendant's driving under the
influence is an aggravating circumstance that would authorize the jury
to assess punitive damages.2 7 ' Therefore, evidence of a prior DUI is
admissible in the liability phase of a bifurcated trial on the issue of
whether to award punitive damages:
Even though the danger of prejudice is a reason to exclude this
evidence, in balance, this evidence's relevance on liability for punitive
damages outweighs any prejudice if the jury is fully charged that this
evidence goes only to liability for punitive damages and not to the
issues of liability or damages in the particular incident on trial.2 4
Pointing out that the trial court has the authority to further sever the
issues in a trial, the court of appeals held that it is an abuse of
discretion to exclude prior DUI evidence from the issue of liability for
punitive damages in a proceeding that is bifurcated only as to amount
of punitive damages.276 While the court of appeals recognized the
possibility of employing a trifurcated procedure, it did not mandate

269. 224 Ga. App. at 843-44, 482 S.E.2d at 379.
270. Id. at 844, 482 S.E.2d at 379.
271. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(dXl), (2) (Supp. 1997).
272. 224 Ga. App. at 845, 482 S.E.2d at 380.
273. Id. (citing Thompson v. Moore, 174 Ga. App. 331, 329 S.E.2d 914 (1985) and Holt
v. Grinnell, 212 Ga. App. 520, 441 S.E.2d 874 (1994)).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 846, 482 S.E.2d at 381.
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trifurcation, leaving this uniquely procedural decision up to the trial
judgeY 6
I. Renewal Actions
The court of appeals addressed a question of first impression in Owens
v. Hewell:277 Under O.C.G.A. section 9-2-61,278 the Georgia renewal
statute, from which date does the six-month renewal period run-the
date of an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision dismissing the
prior case or the date of the United States Supreme Court's denial of the
subsequent petition for certiorari? Plaintiffs in Owens filed suit
originally in the Northern District of Georgia, but that court dismissed
their federal claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal.
Without seeking a stay, plaintiffs petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari, which was denied. Subsequently, plaintiffs refiled
their state law claims in superior court under the renewal statute. The
superior court granted summary judgment to defendants.27
The renewal statute allows a plaintiff whose timely filed federal action
is dismissed without prejudice to renew that claim in a state court
within the original statute of limitations or within six months after the
dismissal, whichever is later.' The plaintiffs must refile their claims
within six months after those claims have been dismissed in federal
court."s Plaintiffs in Owens contended that their renewal action was
timely because they refiled it within six months of the United States
Supreme Court's denial of their petition for certiorari. 2 The Georgia
Court of Appeals disagreed.2"
In reaching its decision, the court noted that plaintiffs had a statutory
right to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals but did not have
a statutory right to appeal to the United States Supreme Court because
The court also
the grant of certiorari is a discretionary review.'
Prov.
Ballentine
Glick
case,
Circuit
found persuasive the Eighth
duce, 2 in which this issue was previously addressed. The Eighth

276. Id.
277. 222 Ga. App. 563, 474 S.E.2d 740 (1996).
278.

O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (Supp. 1997).

279. 222 Ga. App. at 563, 474 S.E.2d at 741. See O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61.
280. O.C.GA. § 9-2-61.
281. 222 Ga. App. at 564, 474 S.E.2d at 741; see O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61.
282. Id at 564, 474 S.E.2d at 741.
283. Id. at 565, 474 S.E.2d at 742.
284. Id. at 564, 474 S.E.2d at 741-42 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) and Potts v. Flax, 313
F.2d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 1963)).
285. 397 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1968).
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Circuit affirmed a trial court's dismissal for failure to comply with the
time limitation of a renewal statute because plaintiffs never sought a
stay while petitioning for certiorari. 2m The Eighth Circuit likewise
rejected the argument that the filing of a petition for certiorari prevents
the judgment of the court of appeals from becoming final until the
Supreme Court acts on the petition and ruled that the mere petition for
certiorari does not have the effect of operating as a stay. 7 The
Georgia Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs' unsuccessful pursuit of a
discretionary appeal to the Supreme Court did not extend their right to
renew their action under O.C.G.A. section 9-2-61 absent a stay and
further held that the six-month renewal period runs from the date of the
Eleventh Circuit's decision.'
Another important case on renewal actions that litigators should keep
in mind is Reid v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 2 "' The case
is important in its application of the renewal statute to uninsuredunderinsured motorist (rU.M.") carriers. Plaintiff-insured filed an action
against defendants for injuries she allegedly sustained in an automobile
collision. Defendants were insured by State Casualty Insurance
Company. Plaintiff-insured did not serve her U.M. carrier because there
was apparently no reason to believe defendants were uninsured. During
the pendency of the lawsuit and more than two years after the date of
the collision, defendants' liability carrier was declared insolvent.
Subsequently, plaintiff-insured served her U.M. carrier, but before the
U.M. carrier's answer was due, plaintiff-insured voluntarily dismissed
the suit. She filed a renewal action within the six-month period allowed
under O.C.G.A. section 9-2-61. In the renewal action, the U.M. carrier
moved for summary judgment asserting that the original action against
it was void because the statute of limitations had expired prior to service
on the U.M. carrier. The trial court granted summary judgment to the
U.M. carrier.'
The rule announced by the Georgia Supreme Court in Hobbs v.
Arthur2 " ' is that the "'privilege of dismissal and renewal does not
apply to cases decided on their merits or to void cases, but does allow
renewal if the previous action was merely voidable."'" Furthermore,
the supreme court has held that the renewal statute is remedial in

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
at 323).

222 Ga. App. at 564-65, 474 S.E.2d at 742 (citing Glick, 397 F.2d at 594).
Id. (citing Glick, 397 F.2d at 594).
I& at 565, 474 S.E.2d at 742.
223 Ga. App. 204, 477 S.E.2d 369 (1996).
Id at 204, 477 S.E.2d at 370.
264 Ga. 359, 444 S.E.2d 322 (1994).
223 Ga. App. at 205, 477 S.E.2d at 370 (quoting Hobbs, 264 Ga. at 360, 444 S.E.2d
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A suit is
nature and is to be construed liberally to allow renewal.'
generally only voidable, not void, until the trial court enters an order
dismissing a valid action.'
The court of appeals pointed out that although the U.M. carrier in the
present case would most likely have raised a statute of limitations
defense in the original suit, plaintiff dismissed the suit before the U.M.
carrier did so.295 The case was merely voidable until the time the trial
Any defenses
court could rule on an asserted affirmative defense.'
raised in a renewed action are adjudicated only with respect to the
renewed action. 7 The court of appeals noted that Hobbs and Georgia
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kilgore,'" wherein the supreme
court held that dismissal of an action is not required when there was a
significant delay between the timely filing of a tort claim and service on
a U.M. carrier even when service was not perfected until after the
running of the statute of limitations,"' have seemingly created an
exception to the supreme court holding in Bohannon v. J.C. Penney
Casualty Insurance Co.' ° that a U.M. carrier must be served within
the time allowed for valid service on the defendant in a tort action.30'
While our courts generally disfavor doing indirectly what cannot be
done directly, it appears that Kilgore's application of Hobbs allows an
uninsured motorist carrier to be brought into a voidable action after
the statute of limitation has run as to it and, then, after dismissal and
refiling, precludes raising defenses which could have been asserted only
in the original action.'
The court of appeals appears to approve of the result: "It would seem a
terrible injustice to say that persons who had purchased uninsured
motorist coverage in complete good faith could be denied the benefit of
their contracts under such circumstances."' The court ended with a
call for legislative action, or at least reconsideration by the supreme

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 206, 477 S.E.2d at 371.
265 Ga. 836, 462 S.E.2d 713 (1995).
Id. at 837, 462 S.E.2d at 714.
259 Ga. 162, 377 S.E.2d 853 (1989).
Id. at 163, 377 S.E.2d at 853.
223 Ga. App. at 206, 477 S.E.2d at 371.
Id
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court, regarding the applicability of the two-year statute of limita°
tions.'Q
J. Miscellaneous
Though not entirely ground-breaking cases, the following represent
interesting opinions that may prove useful to litigators.
It seems that every year a case will pop up concerning the issue of
qualifying jurors as to the defendant's insurance carrier. 5 With
Smith v. Crump,306 this year was no different. In affirming the
qualification of the jury as to defendant's liability carrier, the court of
appeals, in an opinion authored by Judge Eldridge, gave a succinct
lesson in the history and reasoning of the rule, beginning in the
1920.07 The court pointed out that "[s]ince 1921, when the first jury
was qualified as to insurance coverage and the various other situations
when insurance is properly before the jury, there has been no systemwide failure of justice caused by the knowledge of the existence of
insurance."3 8
The court was most persuasive in its response to Chief Judge Beasley's
argument in Franklin v. Tackett3' that jurors who do not know the
insurance carrier is involved cannot be affected in making their
decision." 0 The court made the cogent argument, also made by these
authors in last year's survey,1 that ignorance of the existence of
insurance would prevent bias only so long as the jurors remain ignorant:
304. Id. at 207, 477 S.E.2d at 371. The court of appeals applies common-sense
reasoning in its argument against applying the two-year statute of limitations to U.M.
carriers in these situations. The court notes the dilemma of lawyers who represent
plaintiffs in automobile collision cases and who have no reason to anticipate that the
defendants would become uninsured after suit is filed:
[I]f the two-year statute is to be strictly applied, these lawyers would be forced to
serve[] their client's uninsured motorist carrier in every case and try to hold them
in the case against the slim possibility that the defendant would become
uninsured before the case was concluded and any judgment collected. Should
counsel serve the uninsured carrier under those circumstances, he or she would
immediately be called upon to defend a motion for summary judgment or a
declaratory judgment action, no doubt including an application for frivolous
litigation expenses, based on a defense that the defendant was not uninsured.
Id. at 206-07, 477 S.E.2d at 371.
305. See last year's survey for a thorough discussion of this issue. C. Frederick Overby
& Teresa ,T. Abell, Trial Practiceand Procedure, 48 MERcERL. REv. 517, 560 (1996).
306. 223 Ga. App. 52, 476 S.E.2d 817 (1996).
307. Id. at 54-55, 476 S.E.2d at 819.
308. Id. at 55, 476 S.E.2d at 820.
309. 209 Ga. App. 448, 433 S.E.2d 710 (1993).
310. Id. at 450, 433 S.E.2d at 711 (Beasley, P.J., concurring specially).
311. Overby & Abell, supra note 305, at 562.
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However, what if [the jurors] were not truthful in their voir dire to
disclose employment or stock ownership on purpose; what if during

trial they suddenly become aware of their interest; or what if, more
insidious, someone reveals the common interest between the juror and
the party on trial by a company logo on a lapel pin, stationery file
folder 3 or
anything that would make the association in the juror's
12
mind?

Most important, noted the court, is that there be a public perception of
fairness and impartiality of a jury as well as the actual impartiality of
the jury' 13 The Georgia appellate courts have balanced the interests
of the parties and determined, as a matter of public policy, that the
harm, if any, to the insured from qualifying the jury as to the insurer is
"vastly outweighed by the fundamental right to an impartial jury" 14
Another case of interest on jury issues, but on the subject of jury
instructions, is Jefferson Insurance Co. v. Dunn. 15 In Jefferson
Insurance,the court of appeals affirmed the principle that a jury charge
on the adverse inference permitted when a party withholds evidence is
proper when a person in a civil action invokes a testimonial privilege. 8' "'Although a person does have a right to invoke the privilege[s] [under O.C.G.A. section 24-9-27] in a civil case in order to protect
himself, when he does so,17 an inference against his interest may be
drawn by the factfinder.'1
Finally, like cases on qualifying the jury as to insurers, at least one
case seems to surface each year that implicates technological advances
such as the infamous fax machine. Again, with the case of Department
1 8 this year was no different. The main
of Transportation u. Norris,"
issue in Norris was whether plaintiff timely filed his ante litem notice
on the Georgia Department of Transportation ("D.O.T.") under O.C.G.A.
section 50-21-26.319 Plaintiff brought an action for wrongful death and
other damages against the D.O.T. Plaintiff mailed his ante litem notice
within twelve months of the date of loss, but the state did not receive the

312. 223 Ga. App. at 56, 476 S.E.2d at 820.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. 224 Ga. App. 732, 482 SE.2d 383 (1997).
316. Id. at 743, 482 S.E.2d at 393.
317. Id. (quoting Simpson v. Simpson, 233 Ga. 17, 21, 209 S.E.2d 611, 614 (1974), and
citing Ostroffv. Coyner, 187 Ga. App. 109, 115-16, 369 S.E.2d 298, 304 (1988)).
318. 222 Ga. App. 361, 474 S.E.2d 216 (1996), rev'd, 268 Ga. 192, 486 S.E.2d 826
(1997). Two judges of the three-judge panel concurred in the judgment only.
319. O.C.GA. § 50-21-26 (1994).
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notice until one day after the expiration of the twelve-month period.820
The court of appeals has previously held that written notice must be
received by the state within the requisite statutory period.321 Norris
had an interesting twist, however. Plaintiff also attempted to provide
the required notice by a fax that was sent and received within the
requisite time period. The trial court denied the D.O.T.'s motion to
dismiss, finding that the fax transmission satisfied the requirement of
O.C.G.A. section 50-21-26(a)(1) that the notice be given in writing. The
trial court decided that the "requirement of receipt of the notice within
twelve months does not require that the certified mail or personal
delivery be accomplished within the same time frame so long as notice
has been given in writing and mailed by certified mail, return receipt
requested, within that time frame."'
The court of appeals did not agree with the trial court's interpretation
of the statute's requirements. The court held that the statute's
provisions must be read together so that "a proper notice of claim must
be given by a writing which is both delivered by the date required by
O.C.G.A. [section] 50-21-26(a)(1) and delivered by the method provided
in O.C.G.A. [section] 50-21-26(a)(2)." 23
The court also added its opinion that a facsimile transmission does not
8 24
satisfy the statutory requirement that the notice be in writing.
"Such a transmission is an audio signal via a telephone line containing
information from which a writing may be accurately duplicated, but the
transmission of beeps and chirps along a telephone line is not a writing,
as that term is customarily used."326

320. 222 Ga. App. at 361, 474 S.E.2d at 217.
321. Hardy v. Candler County, 214 Ga. App. 627, 631, 448 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1994),
overruled by Norris v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 268 Ga. 192, 486 S.E.2d 826 (1997).
322. 222 Ga. App. at 361-62, 474 S.E.2d at 217.
323. Id. at 362, 474 S.E.2d at 218. This court of appeals opinion was reversed by the
Georgia Supreme Court after this year's survey period ended. See Norris v. Georgia Dep't
of Transp., 268 Ga. at 192, 486 S.E.2d at 828. The supreme court wisely held that actual
receipt by the state of the ante litem notice is not required under the Tort Claims Act. Id.
The notice must be mailed within the time prescribed. Id. The court noted that to hold
the sender responsible for ensuring actual receipt within the statutory time would put an
unreasonable burden on the sender because a document placed in the mail is no longer in
the sender's control. Id.
324. 222 Ga. App. at 362, 474 S.E.2d at 218.
325. Id. The supreme court stated that because it had found that a mailed notice of
claim satisfies the statute, it would not decide whether a facsimile notice would suffice as
a writing. 268 Ga. at 193, 486 S.E.2d at 827 n.1.
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CONCLUSION

Both the General Assembly and the appellate courts made important
contributions to the law of Georgia in the area of trial practice and

procedure during the survey period. The authors hope this Article will
be useful to the practitioner in keeping abreast of these important
developments.

